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PREFACE
Almost since the beginning of the nuclear age strategists and policy makers
have struggled to develop policies which would deter, or failing to deter, to win a
nuclear war. Like the subject matter, this debate has frequently generated more heat
than light.
The participants in this vital and on-going effort span the spectrum from those
who believe, "that even to think about a war, which they believe will cataclysmically
end life on earth, is immoral," to those who believe that a nuclear war is not only
practicable, but is winnable. It is no wonder that there has been little agreement on
the effectiveness, usefulness or even morality of deterrent strategies.
Despite the hopes of most of mankind, the collapse of the Soviet Union has not
lessened the importance of this international debate on deterrent strategies. The
proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear technology and other weapons of mass
destruction can only increase our sense of urgency as we come to face a world with
many more nuclear actors, and a world in which some of these may not be rational
in the common sense of the term.
The purpose of this work is to begin the development of a methodology for the
evaluation of deterrent policies. This is not intended as a theoretical exercise. It is
intended to be a practical tool for use by the decision maker. As such, this
methodology must possess several key features; it must first be capable of capturing
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the subtleties of a policy and expressing complexity lucidly. It must provide a logical
framework for analyses which are clear, useful and self-consistent. Finally, in order
to be useful to the strategist, these results must be repeatable, testable and
predictive.
This basic methodology is developed in Part II of this work. In it that deterrent
policy may be evaluated by the use of equations derived from Utility Theory. These
equations explore the expected utility of the various possible outcomes of a strategy.
Some of the coefficients in these equations are objective values, such as" the cost of
defensive systems," and some are subjective values, such as "the benefits of victory."
Techniques exist to determine the relative values of subjective variables as perceived
by the decision-maker, and then to combine these with the relative worth of the
objective variables. The extension of these techniques such as Multi-Attribute
Decision Making and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) must wait for further
analysis. For the purposes of this study and the analysis of courses of action for the
government of Kazakhstan we have used the "Rational Man" approach. That is to
say "if the rational man were a Kazakh with all the historical experiences and societal
constraints, how would he subjectively evaluate outcome of various deterrent
strategies?"
In order to employ the Rational Man technique it is necessary to develop an
understanding of the historical forces which formed the Kazakh people. It is
necessary to understand the society, value structures and national interests. Part I
of this work explores Kazakhstan and the Kazakh people in detail. In understanding
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the national policy, emphasis is placed on the attitudes of the ethnic Kazakh. It is
the perceptions of the ethnic Kazakh which set Kazakhstan apart from the rest of the
world. If the ethnic Kazakh lose power and Kazakhstan is again ruled as a part of
Russia then Kazakhstan has no independent deterrent policy and this analysis is
unnecessary.
The reader who is familiar with Central Asia and Kazakhstan, or who is
interested primarily in the derivation of the valuative methodology may skip Part I
and go directly to Part II; however, in this case, some of the analysis may become
unclear.
I wish to thank Dr. Jim Wirtz for his unfailing interest and encouragement.
Without his support I would never have attempted such an ambitious task and
without his confident guidance I might never have completed it. I also owe a debt
of gratitude to Dr. Roman Laba for precipitating my interest in the former Soviet
republics. It was his unequaled insight and encyclopedic knowledge of the former
Soviet Union and the newly formed republics and his understanding of current
developments which made so much clear. Lastly I wish to thank Dr. Bill Kemple for
his advise and for taking the time to review the derivation of the utility equations
which are the heart of this work.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses utility theory to derive an equation expressing the utility of
deterrent strategies. The resulting equation is then tested against the deterrent
options available to the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan. It predicts the
failure of current United States policy and the retention, by Kazakhstan, of some
form of nuclear deterrence in order to counter Russian aggression brought on by
ethnic unrest in Kazakhstan. It further suggests that the deterrent option chosen by
Kazakhstan may be irrationality-based deterrence which may lead to the development
of some form of "doomsday machine."
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PART I, KAZAKHSTAN
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades of the twentieth century have seen the historically
unprecedented implosion and collapse of the Soviet Empire. Political, economic and
social relationships, stable for 70 years have, in the space of 20 months been almost
completely rewritten by a tidal wave of discontent. From the viewpoint of the rest
of the world, as well as the governments and peoples of the former USSR, one of the
most critical issues is the future of the emerging sovereign republics.
In the wake of Perestroika the emerging republics of the former USSR have
assumed global importance. Certainly the shape of modem Eurasia and perhaps the
stability of the rest of the world will rest on the conditions in the newly independent
republics. Hence, it is of vital importance to understand the relationships being
forged between the new republics. In doing so we must answer several key questions
which will predict the possibility of peaceful relations. First, with regard to inter-
republic relations; can historical animosity be countered by economic necessity?
Second, and interior to the republics; can the social and political structures common
to all the republics, which were grafted on or created out of whole cloth by the
Communist Party, stand in the face of resurgent ethnic animosities? What will be
the fate of the non-indigenous peoples who were resettled for reasons of state policy?
Will the results of a new social contract be integration and tolerance or segregation
and discrimination? Third, can the new republics achieve a stable form of democracy
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and then establish the peaceful and cooperative inter- and intra- republic
relationships which would allow them to address their enormous problems of
environmental damage, obsolescent economies in ruins, runaway ethnic ambitions
and problems of security which may involve nuclear weapons?
Conflict in any corner of the former USSR could conceivably lead to a full
scale conflagration, but the four republics with nuclear arms demand particular
attention. Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and of course the Russian Federation each
became de facto nuclear powers when they inherited that portion of the strategic
arsenal which was based on their soil. Of these four the situation in Kazakhstan may
be perhaps the most complex. Because of its unique position it would be worthwhile
to examine Kazakhstan in some detail.
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II. KAZAKHSTAN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIE
Kazakhstan is the second largest member of the former USSR. With an area
of slightly over 1,000,000 square miles, it is approximately the size of Western
Europe. Sparsely populated by 16.5 million Kazakhs, Slavic Europeans and assorted
other ethnic groups Kazakhstan claims over 16% of the USSR's grain producing
lands, the second largest proven mineral reserves and a portion of the Soviet strategic
arsenal. In addition, Kazakhstan is home to the Baikonur space launch complex and
in the northeast the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing grounds. To understand the
current social and political situation in Kazakhstan it is necessary to understand the
historical forces which have formed the Kazakh nation.
As described by L Krader, The history of Central Asia may be divided into
three periods. In the first period, from about 500 B.C. to 900 A.D., the Central
Asian populations were of predominately Iranian origin. During this period, animal
husbandry and irrigation agriculture became wide-spread. Islam was introduced by
Arab merchants and conquerors. Trade became more profitable when stable trade
routes were established between the Far East, the Middle East and South Asia. This
period was brought to a close by waves of Turkish raiders who eventually conquered
and having settled were converted to Islam. (Krader, 1962, pp. 73-74)
The Second, or Medieval Period, extended from 900 A.D. to 1700 A.D. This
period saw the flowering of Islamic culture and then assaults on that culture by the
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Mongol invasions, the establishment of the Mongol Chingisid Empire and the
dissolution of the empire into numerous small successor states.
The Modem period, beginning in 1700 A.D., is principally the story of the
incorporation of Central Asia into the Russian Empire. Commencing with the
establishment of a Tsarist fort at Omsk in 1716, through the conquest of the Kazakh
steppe in the 19th century and ending with the incorporation of the last independent
Khanates, Khiva and Bukhara, into the Soviet Union in 1921, the expansion of the
Russian Empire was unrelenting. It remains to be seen whether this tide has turned
in the closing years of the twentieth century.
Under Soviet rule, the policy of national delimination, created five nations from
the peoples of Central Asia; the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirgiz and Tajik Soviet
Socialist Republics. (Simon, 1991, p. 79) This Soviet strategy was intended to
combat the attraction of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic ideals by developing a sense of
nationhood among the hitherto tribal peoples. This sense of separateness was
fostered through the creation of separate written languages, the publication of new
and partially fictional histories and a stress placed on political and cultural
separateness rather than the commonality of local peoples. Economic systems were
integrated bilaterally with Russia, rather than horizontally with neighboring
republics. In counterbalance to this newly created sense of nationhood, the party and
the state were ruthless in stamping out any opposition to Soviet policy and rule. Few
nations or peoples in the Soviet Union were subjected to such intense pressures as
the Kazakhs, whose society and very land were irrevocably changed by the process.
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A. PRE-TSARIST HISTORY
The Kazakh trace their origin to an amalgamation of peoples formed in the
wake of successive waves of Turkic and Mongol invaders.
In the earliest periods of Central Asian history, pastoral and farming peoples
migrated northward from Iranian cultural centers. Here they established centers of
agriculture along the major river valleys, developed large scale irrigation projects, and
established trade routes with civilizations further to the east. Drawn by rich plunder
and forced by population pressure the Turkish invaders came first to raid and then
to rule. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Turks had estab-lished firm
control over most of Central Asia. Large scale conversions of the Turkic peoples to
Islam strengthened the position of Islam as a state religion. By the end of the 11th
century a Turkish dynasty, Korezm-Shah had established itself as the secular power
for all of Eastern Islam. (Simon, 1991, p. 83)
To the north Temujinr son of the Mongol chieftain Yesugai, completed
unification of the Mongol tribes around Lake Baikal in 1206. After establishing his
capital in Karakorum he proclaimed himself Chingis Khan and commenced conquest
of the world as he knew it. Ai. -r having overcome the Chin empire in 1215 and
later Kara-Khitai in Northeast Kazakhstan, he found the pretext for a new war in the
alleged mistreatment of his ambassadors by the Turkish ruler of Korezm (Persia and
Northwest Kazakhstan). Gathering a force of 200,000 men he destroyed the
kingdom, and then pursued the ruler of Korezm, Shah Alaud-Dii. Mohammed, to his
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death on the shores of the Caspian Sea. (Encyclopedia of Military History, 1986, pp.
336-337)
The conquest of Central Asia by the Mongol tribes under Chingis Khan was a
disaster for the entire region. Among others, the cities of Samarkand, Bukhara and
Tashkent were ruined. The irrigation systems were destroyed and large scale
agriculture became impossible. Some of those systems have not been fully rebuilt
to this day. Crop failure and famine followed throughout Central Asia. Throughout
this portion of the Mongol empire the era of warring states had come to an end and
there was peace, albeit the peace of the grave.
The Mongols made no conscious effort to change indigenous social structures.
Rather they made use of local rulers, under close supervision, to collect taxes and
administer the conquered peoples. It was under the enforced peace of the Mongols
that the trade routes were once again opened. In time the new rulers were also
converted to Islam, and by the time of Uzbek Khan (1313-1340) Central Asian rulers
were routinely Muslim. (Lapidus, 1991, p. 418)
Paradoxically it was one of the strengths of the Mongol social structure which
helped bring about the empire's speedy dissolution into ever smaller warring states.
The nomadic societies of Central Asia are patrilineal in nature. They are tightly
bound by tradition and custom which, as well as providing structure, serve to prevent
conflict by a predetermination of most issues which could cause dissension. Among
the Turko-Mongol nomads property was divided equally among the heirs. The
kingdom of the Great Khan was considered his personal property and upon his death
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it too was divided, according to the custom among his heirs. Before very many
generations had passed the empire had been reduced to many small and not very
cooperative states.
Chingis Khan left to his eldest son, Juchi, the Kipchack Steppe as his
inheritance. The second son, Chagatay, received Samarkand, Bukhara and territory
to the east as his domain, or Ulus. The Kazakh established themselves in the eastern
portion of Chagatay's Ulus. Tracing their lineage to a common great founding
ancestor, Alash, they numbered around 1,000,000 in the latter half of the Fifteenth
century. This concept of lineage and genealogy is an important force in Central
Asian society and will be discussed more fully in a later section.
The Kazakhs were briefly united under Kasim Khan; however, with his death
and the decline of the Golden Horde, the Kazakhs split into the Great, Middle and
Lesser Hordes. The Lesser Horde was the western most, closest to Russia; the Great
Horde was the eastern most, closest to China.
B. RUSSIAN CONQUEST
The Kazakhs were forced into the arms of advancing Russian imperialism by
defeats on their Eastern frontier at the hands of the Kalmyks. Under constant
pressure from these aggressive neighbors of mongol descent the Kazakhs had steadily
lost ground since the early Seventeenth century. It was as much to forestall the'
establishment of an aggressive Kalmyk state on the Russian border as to acquire the
Central Asian steppe that Russia accepted oaths of fealty from Abu'l Khayr in 1731.
(Olcott, 1987, p. 31) The initial alliance with Russia was not restrictive, however the
8
years saw increasing Russian involvement in Kazakh affairs until in the end Russia
sought to completely control the Kazakh people. While the Khans might be
persuaded to accept Russian rule the individual families remained unconvinced. The
Kazakh as a whole did not go peacefully into the Russian Empire. A series of
revolts in 1783 and 1797 were followed by 60 years of guerrilla warfare. In 1824 the
Kazakh Khanates were abolished and direct rule established. The offshoot Bukey
Horde revolted in 1838. There was a major effort to break free in 1847, and a
bloody uprising in the name of Islam in 1868. However, with their victory in 1868,
Russia could at last claim full and firm control over Kazakhstan.
The Russian conquest was initially a simple military occupation, uncomplicated
by Slavic settlers looking for land or trade. The administration of the territories was
entrusted entirely to military authority, which for reasons of economy made extensive
use of the existing power structure. The Russian administration was paralleled by
indigenous Kazakh institutions. This arrangement allowed effective control of the
population and reduced the costs of the occupation.
Russian policy did not seek to integrate the Kazakhs into Russia itself. They
were treated as aliens, exempted from military service and discouraged from mixing
with the Russian population. As a matter of policy the Tsarist administration
attempted to weaken Kazakh society. Because of this, the Russian occupation was
even more of a disaster than the Mongol invasion. Kazakh city dwellers were
expelled, lands were confiscated and Quran schools closed. Russian officials
continually attempted to weaken the influence of Islam. Because of Russian
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ignorance, these efforts were somewhat counterproductive. Professor Grigoriev, a
nineteenth century schol. and imperial advisor (Olcott, 1987, p. 128) commented on
the difficulties of forming an effective Russian policy:
Still worse results followed; another misunderstanding of ours was, that the
Kazakhs were Mohammedans, whereas in the last century they were almost all
Shamanists. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few
of the Khans and Sultans had even a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and
performed some few of the rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the
Kazakh Steppes, not a single mullah performed there the rites of the
Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kazakhs have really become
Mussulmans to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for
Mussulmans and treating them as such.
The dispersion of the predominately Islamic city dwellers to the country-side,
combined with Russian assaults on Islamic practice, appear to have converted Islam
into the national religion as a form of protest.
C. POST-CONQUEST KAZAKH SOCIETY
Prior to conquest, the Kazakh people were organized in the form of a series of
concentric circles. The inner-most, the individual, was surrounded by his extended
family. The family was inclosed in the village and the villages in turn formed a clan.
Clans, joined by genealogies to a common ancestor joined together in confederations.
These confederations formed the basis of the state, the Khanate. (Krader, 1962, pp.
150-153)
The individual in his extended family was the member of an entity similar to
a corporation, which like a modern corporation was immortal, could hold property,
restricted membership, provided services to its members and demanded service in
return. The extended families formed villages, Qishlaqs, for the farmers or Aul for
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the nomads. The villages were bound together by blood and marriage and when they
were grouped together, with other kin related villages, they formed a clan.
After conquest the Kazakh social structure was shoehorned into the Russian
format. Both sedentary and nomadic villages were organized in much the same way.
The villages were run by an elected elder, Aqsaqai (aq white, sakal beard), usually
from the ruling group. Several villages, composed a Volost. Groups of families,
usually five, were represented by electors. These electors in turn choose the Volost
leaders and judges. (Allworth, 1967, pp. 153-154) The original social structure of
the Kazakhs was incompatible with the imposed Russian structure. As a result the
Kazakh society devolved into the smallest social unit which would fit within the
Russian structure, the kin-village. The clans did not vanish but remained with
diminished material importance but significant social value. Clan membership gave
and continues to give a sense of belonging to the individual Kazakh. It provides a
mortar to hold the people together.
Contact with the more industrialized and wealthy Russian culture was not
without effect. By the late 1800's, some Kazakh intellectuals had developed theories
favoring assimilation. A small number of intellectuals had attended Russian schools
and then gone on to serve in the army or in the provincial administration. From this
experience they believed that a collaboration was possible between the Russian and
Kazakh peoples. Several schools were opened for teachers. Educators were trained
in a Russian style of education using Kazakh and a Cyrillic alphabet. Kazakh
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assimilationist desires were short lived. They ended with the first wave of immigrants
from European Russia. (Lapidus, 1991, p. 763)
D. TSARIST IMMIGRATION, THE FIRST WAVE
Drawn by cheap and apparently unoccupied virgin land, settlers from western
Russia began to arrive in increasing numbers. They seized pasture for farmland and
blocked traditional migration routes. The already hard pressed Kazakh were further
restricted. Between 1896 and 1916 more than 1,000,000 peasants settled in the
region of Turgay, Akmolinsk (Tselinograd), Semipalatinsk and in the Khirgiz lands
to the south. (Allworth, 1967, pp. 160-161) The Russians brought farming to the
Kazakh plains. Starting in 1896, when there was almost no land under cultivation,
by 1913, 38 million acres (8.3%) of the Steppe oblasts were planted in wheat, millet
and other grains. (Allworth, 1967, p. 282) When the Kazakh nomadic tribesman was
forced from his best grazing grounds and found traditional migration routes blocked
by vast estates, he had no other choice than to become a farmer himself. This
transformation, driven by hunger and economic necessity, was difficult and slow. As
an intermediate step in this transition many herdsmen became a sort of rancher,
sedentary herdsmen who raised livestock on fodder. A centuries old way of life was
dying, painfully. The already low Kazakh standard of living was reduced to new
levels of poverty by the expropriation of land for settlers, reduction in herds and
grazing rights, and by exploitation of the herdsmen by Russian merchants.
Resentment of the Russians was high. They were blamed for every wrong, from
cholera to locusts and from weather to taxes. The decades of Tsarist rule are one
12
long history of secret societies and spontaneous popular revolts led by charismatic
leaders who focused the free-floating resentment of an angry population.
In the last years of the Russian empire the Kazakhs once again revolted. In
1916 World War I was not going well for Russia. Shortages of manpower led to the
conscription of the previously exempt Kazakhs for non-combattant duties in
construction battalions. Shortages of horses in the army led to the requisitioning of
Kazakh horse herds. Inflation and the costs of the war led to an increase in taxes,
in some cases up to 15 fold. These grievances came to a head in the bloody revolt
of 1916. Although it was unsuccessful and put down with great severity the revolt
of 1916 left embers which would smolder and ignite in the numerous national
movements during the Russian revolution of 1917.
E. THE 1917 RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
Exhausted and beaten in the aftermath of the ruthless suppression of the 1916
revolt, the majority of Central Asian peoples took no part in the Russian revolution.
Instead they waited, and watched the outcome, with some hope and a faint optimism.
They were disappointed. The former subject peoples were soon alienated by the
ineptness of the Provisional Government and by the skillful politics of it's Bolshevik
opponents. Two issues were of the greatest concern to the Central Asian peoples:
first, what degree of independence would be permitted to the subject peoples by the
Provisional Government; and second would confiscated lands be restored? The
Provisional Government was unable to satisfy the Kazakhs on either count. Political
attempts at accommodation failed when the Russian administrators reflexively
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resisted a loosening of control in the southern provinces. Land restoration was
impossible for reasons of ethnic sentiment and practical internal Russian politics.
The Provisional Government could not seriously consider dispossessing the Russian
immigrants. Predictably, politics in Central Asia split along ethnic lines. Support for
the Provisional Government collapsed.
By the time of the October Revolution in 1917, the plains of Central Asia were
aflame. Throughout the area political movements struggled against the ethnic
Russians, the Whites, the Reds and each other. In what was to become Kazakhstan,
the most important of these national liberation movements was the Alash Orda, the
Horde of Alash, named for the mythical founder of the Kazakh people. The Alash
Orda became the leading political force on the plains. At the Third Kazakh
congress, convened at Orenburg in December, 1917, the Alash Orda proclaimed
Kazakh autonomy and elected an executive to manage the struggle for independence.
In a complicated three sided civil war, the Kazakh leaders first attempted to join the
Whites, who were under Kolchak in the east, and then with the Bashkirs in the west.
When they were rejected by both, the Alash Orda joined with the Bolsheviks after
receiving assurances of safety for themselves, their troops and promises of autonomy
for Kazakhstan. (Allworth, 1967, pp. 236-238) In the end the Kazakhs had chosen
the winning side and the White counter-revolution was defeated.
F. REABSORPTION
On August 26, 1920, the Kirgiz [sic] Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
(KASSR) was created as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
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(RSFSR). The term "Kirgiz" was then applied to both the Kazakh and Kirgiz
national areas. The Constituent Assembly of the KASSR declared an end to
colonialism in October 1920 and opened the way for recovery of expropriated lands
in April of 1921. (Allworth, 1967, p. 239) This was not as bold or as independent
a move as it might first appear, it simply seconded a June 29, 1920 declaration by the
Politburo of the Russian Communist Party titled, "Our Tasks in Turkestan." In this
resolution the Central Committee offered the bait, redress of colonial wrongs,
embedded with the hook, the establishment of central control. The announced intent
of the resolution was:
1. To take away from the settlers in the Kirghiz [Kazakhstan] districts all land
allocated by the [pre-revolutionary] Migration office...
2. Provide landless dekhans [peasants] with land.
3. To smash all kulaks [well-to-do settlers] organizations...
4. Deport into Russian concentration camps...Tsarist officials whose
employment in Turkestan is politically unacceptable...
5. ...Transfer and place at the disposal of the Central Committee all those
Turkestan communists who are infected with the colonialist spirit and Great-
Russian nationalism, and at the same time to conduct in the center the
mobilization of several hundred Communists for work in Turkestan.
(Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, p. 43)
Submerged in the popularity of land reform and hidden behind the perceived
necessity of safeguarding the revolution, the Central Committee had firmly
established that local parties were completely subject to central control. This popular
removal of anti-muslim, anti-native factions was in reality the first purge. More
would follow.
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As a member of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) the
Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) had little real freedom of
action. By decree of the Central Committee, June 1919, the RSFSR reserved for
federal control the functional areas of transport, finance, military, economic and
labor affairs.
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) was formed in
1924, the Kirgiz ASSR entered as a part of the RSFSR. Shortly there-after the
Kirgiz ASSR was divided into two parts. The portion inhabited primarily by the
Kazakh people was combined with the Syr-Darya Oblast and renamed the Kazakh
ASSR. After several additions and deletions the remaining portion became the
Kirgiz ASSR in 1926. The constitution of 1924 reclaimed still more functions for the
central government by adding to the list of reserved powers, foreign affairs, foreign
trade, internal trade, defense and communications.
On December 5, 1936, Kazakhstan was accorded the status of "Soviet Socialist
Republic." This new status meant little in the way of independence, because the
constitution of 1936, the "Stalin Constitution," had completed the process of
reabsorption by reserving for All-Union jurisdiction control of the individual SSR
constitutions. This control included the right to ensure conformity of the SSR
constitutions with the USSR constitution. (Krader, 1962, pp. 112-113) Indepen-
dence, such as it was, had been short lived.
The national parties came under assault from the beginning. Administrative
actions, transfers, and purging or ejection from the Communist party and from the
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body politic were common. In these early times to be "purged" did not have the
finality it would acquire in later years. The communist party led government of
Kazakhstan but it was in conflict with Moscow almost from the beginning. Not
unexpectedly, conflict centered around autonomy and land reform. Initially, the
Kazakh Communist Party CP(K), supported "Kazakhstan to the Kazakh" and
attempted to ensure that the CP(K) was a truly Kazakh party. In furtherance of this,
at the 5th Kazakh Party Conference in 1925, the CP(K) declared a virtual
moratorium on immigration into Kazakhstan for ten years. Reaction was swift. At
the 6th Conference in 1927 the CP(K) was forced to renounce this 'Trotskyite-
Zinoviev" line (Simon, 1991, p. 81) and shortly thereafter the Kazakh leadership of
the CP(K) was removed. Their places in the Party Secretariat were taken by
Russians, who under F.I. Goloshchokin, were later replaced by europeans under an
Armenian, C.I. Mirzoyan. This established a pattern which would continue well into
the future. Whenever the local government came in conflict with Moscow, the local
government would be replaced by outside party officials who would settle the matter
to Moscow's liking. Some time later the Kazakhs would again be given the wheel--
until next time.
G. COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE SECOND WAVE OF IMMIGRATION
In Kazakhstan the physical liquidation of leaders and cadre peaked in 1935.
The purging of the leadership was hardly necessary. Their morale and will had long
since been broken by the terrible events of collectivization.
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Collectivization was a disaster unparalleled in the long Kazakh history of
disasters. In Kazakhstan the purpose of collectivization was not only to increase
grain production, but also to restructure and sedentarize Kazakh culture. In 1930 the
large scale settlement of nomadic herdsmen was began with almost no preparation
at all. Clans were moved to distant districts, and settled without adequate food,
water or shelter for their livestock. Promised housing was uncompleted and
construction materials were unavailable. In some cases, the available housing was
of such a low quality that the nomads put the livestock in the houses and lived
themselves n their yurts. (Simon, 1991, p. 107) Utter confusion prevailed, and after
a while authorities sought only to protect themselves by hiding their failures.
Between 1929 and 1933 livestock herds fell from 40 million head to 5 million head.
The Kazakh population fell from 3.9 million to 3 million, a decrease of 21.9%.
Allowing for the out migration of herdsmen to other Soviet republics and China, and
allowing for the normal rate of population increase, the Kazakh population is
believed to have lost over 1.5 million people. The actual percentage loss to the
population living in Kazakhstan may have been closer to 40%. (Krader, 1962, p. 185-
6) In parallel with this catastrophe a second wave of immigration occurred during
the period 1926-1939. Over 1.7 million immigrants arrived in Kazakhstan and
Central Asia from Western Russia. (Simon, 1991, p. 119) The effect on Kazakh
society was traumatic. According to Simon, "The terror of collectivization broke the
Kazakh resistance and increased their willingness to live under the existing conditions
and use them to their advantage." (Simon, 1991, p. 109) While the ever resilient
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clan and family structure survived open resistance ceased. Having adopted a strategy
of cooperation in order to survive, the Kazakhs have become the best represented
Asian people in the Communist party and in the Soviet society as a whole. In 1979
52% of Kazakhs spoke Russian as a second language. As a people they were
members of the Soviet elite in disproportionately high numbers. (Simon, 1991, p.
109)
H. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE SOVIETS
Just as after the Tsarist conquest; after collectivization the Kazakh people again
had to adapt to a newly imposed social structure. The Soviet rural matrix in Central
Asia was composed primarily of the Kolkioz (Collective farm) and the Sovkhoz (State
Farm). The collective farm were composed of Brigades which formed the basic crop
raising unit. The villages were of arbitrary size and could contain more than one
kolkhoz or be contained, with more than one village, in a kolkhoz. Despite attempts
to disperse and disrupt traditional social structures, it appears that many structures,
especially clan-family, managed to survive. Several studies mentioned in Krader
(Krader, 1962, pp. 165-167) describe kolkhoz in which the traditional kinship systems
form the basis of organization, activity and leadership within and between the
kolkhoz in a district. Furthermore, ii vie studies quoted by Krader, it appeared that
clan affiliation remained strong. Genealogies still formed an important part of the
structure, placing each member in their proper place and defining their relationship
with other groups. It may be presumed that because of the agrarian nature of the
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population, traditional forms remain an important contributor to the national
consciousness.1
i. THE VIRGIN LANDS PROJECT
After the Soviet Union had recovered from World War II the Kazakh were to
experience yet another wave of immigration, a wave which would change the very
land.
The cultivation of the Virgin Lands, an area of Northern Kazakhstan, had been
under discussion since the early 1920's. In 1930, at the 16th Party Congress N.M.
Tulaikov reported to the Central Committee:
With wheat we shall go whe-, more valuable crops cannot grow....There are in
Kazakhstan from 50 to 55 million hectares' suitable for sowing...it will tale
approximately 700,000 to 1 million horsepower to bring an additional 20 to 25
million hectares under wheat. (Brezhnev, 1979, p. 35)
Lack of machinery and resources prohibited the project at that time, but the idea was
not forgotten.
In 1953 the USSR produced was 31 million metric tons (MMT) of grain, but,
32 MMT were consumed. Impelled by nation wide low agricultural production at
'The kolkhoz population diminished from 47.5% of the total population in 1939 to 21% in 1959.
In 1939 60.8% of the kolkhoz are listed as Kazakh, thus 28.8% of Kazakhs lived in Kolkhoz. In 1939
no breakout is given for sovkhoz, these are lumped in with industrial workers and classified as "blue
collar workers," and reported as 33.8% of the total population. Given the state of education for native
Kazakhs at this time it would be safe to say that most of the 8.6% of Kazakh blue collar workers were
non-industrial sovkhoz. A calculation for 1959 when 40% of kolkhoz are Kazakh indicates that 8.4%
of the Kazakh now lived on the collective farms; however, by now Soviet sources broke out sovkhoz
separately and statistics for these show that 25.5% of Kazakhs worked on sovkhoz. Hence the
proportion of rural Kazakhs remained nearly the same from over 28.8% in 1939 to 33.4% in 1959.
(Simon, 1991, p. 394)
2One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters or 2.471 acre.
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rates below prewar, and in some cases below pre-revolution levels, the Virgin Lands
project was reopened. Under Nikita Khrushchev's direction, the Central Committee
plenum endorsed a wide-ranging program to develop all branches of agriculture;
however, this would take time, and time was at a premium. According to Leonid
Brezhnev:
Time was to be won with a bold gamble, develop the virgin lands of
Kazakhstan, the Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Novosibrisk and the
Omsk regions. Land in the Volga country, the Urals and in the Far East was
also involved. Land brought under cultivation totaled 42 million hectares, 25
million in Kazakhstan alone. Eighteen million hectares were opened up on the
Kazakh steppes between 1954 and 1955. (Brezhnev, 1979, pp. 11-12)
The goals of the Virgin Lands Project as stated by L.I. Brezhnev (Brezhnev, 1979, p.
62) were to:
- Make grain the main form of agriculture in Kazakhstan.
- Increase production ten-fold. (From 5.4 MMT in 1953 to 54 MMT?.)
(Allworth, 1989, p. 306)
- Radically strengthen the fodder base, ensure a rapid growth in livestock
breeding and in the long term at least double livestock products. [From 24.25
million head in 1951 (Allworth, p. 302) to 48.5 million head]
- Preserve and multiply the natural fertility of the soil.
- Set up the country's largest grain growing farms and to reorganize all of
Kazakhstan on the same model. [Presumably the intent was to replace the
kolkhoz with sovkhoz.]
- Turn all of Northern Kazakhstan into a highly developed economic area.
The hope for a short term success was chosen over the effort of a long term
solution. Unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to raise individual
agricultdral productivity in lands already under cultivation, the Soviets choose the
modern equivalent of "Slash and Burn farming."
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"rhe Kazakhs as a whole," an overwhelming majority according to Brezhnev,
"greeted the Party's decision to plow the feather-grass steppes with tremendous
enthusiasm and approval." (Brezhnev, 1979, p. 17) Spontaneous approval was
probably helped by the 1954 replacement of most of the upper echelons of the
Kazakh Communist Party, including Party 1st Secretary Shayakhmentov, who had
been appointed during WW II. Numerous cadre were also reassigned. Sometime
later, it was mentioned in Soviet publications, that during this time period some
unprogressive Kazakhs had suffered from "narrow-mindedness" and had indeed had
the temerity to call for a return to the 1920 policy of "Indigenization." In the usual
pattern, a Russian, P. Ponomarenko, was appointed as 1st Secretary. Khrushchev
also sent LI. Brezhnev to serve as 2nd Secretary in 1954, and as 1st Secretary 1955-
1956. It was at this time that Brezhnev struck up a friendship with the head of the
Kazakh Republic Academy of Science, DA Kunaev. (Brezhnev, 1979, p. 17) A
mining engineer, Kunaev would later become Chairman of the republic's Council of
Ministers and a member of the CPSU Central Committee.
1. Virgin Lands Immigration, the Third Wave
Well might the Kazakh leaders call for a return to "Indigenization."
Between 1955 and 1962 the third wave of immigration settled 1.2 million non-
Kazakhs in the northern oblasts. This influx reduced the Kazakh people to a
minority in their own country. In 1959 the Kazakhs constituted 30% of the total
population, the Russians and Ukrainians 50.9% and the Volga Germans, who were
resettled during the war, 7.1%. (Simon, 1991, p. 382) The ethnic imbalance was
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more extreme in the north where the majority of the virgin lands were concentrated.
In Tselinograd, Kazakhs were a minority at a ratio of 1:3, in Karaganda 1:5, in
Kustanai 2:7, in Northern Kazakhstan the titular nationality became a minority of
19%. (Katz, 1975, p. 223) Apparently little effort was made by the settlers to
integrate with the Kazakh society. In 1970, 99% of Kazakh spoke Kazakh as their
first language and 41.8% spoke Russian as a second language, more in the areas of
slavic concentration. But, out of a total population of 13 million, 8.7 million of which
were non-Kazakh, only about 1%, 100,000, managed to speak Kazakh. (Katz, 1975,
p. 225)
2. Virgin Lands Project, Success or Failure?
The opening of the virgin lands was indeed a heroic effort. Organized as
sovkhoz instead of kolkhoz, the mechanized state farms placed enormous amounts
of the steppe under cultivation. Plowed land grew from 9 7 million hectares (24.3
million acres) in 1953 to 27.8 million hectares (69.7 million acres) in 1956. In 1958
28.6 million hectares (71.7 million acres) were under cultivation, of which, 23.2
million hectares (58.1 million acres), were in grain. (Allworth, 1989, p. 305) At first
the virgin lands, which had lain fallow for centuries, required little fertilizer. The
untouched soil was initially productive, but then, sadly replicating the experiences of
the mid-western United States in the years after WW I, production began to decline.
From 5.4 MMT in 1953 production of grains rose to 23.5 MMT in 1956 and then
started a fitful decline to 22 MMT in 1958, 18.7 MMT in 1960 and 10.6 MMT in the
disastrous drought year of 1963. (Allworth, 1989, p. 306) The loosened and
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unprotected topsoil was lost to the wind in drought years and caked to concrete-like
consistency in wet years. After several easy years of good harvests, the Soviets were
back where they had started, faced with the necessity and hard work of improving
individual productivity, of simply, becoming good farmers. Slow improvement was
made. By the end of the 1980's, production, in good years, had climbed significantly,
only to plummet to an estimated 12.5 MMT in 1992. (TASS, 11/19/91, 1214)
By the Soviet's own measures, the Virgin Lands project had failed. Grain and
livestock production were well below stated goals. The environment had been
severely damaged and the natural fertility of the soil reduced for the foreseeable
future. In addition to wheat and corn, the massive settlement of Slavic immigrants




During and after the Virgin Lands project the importance of Kazakhstan
necessitated a departure from normal Soviet administrative practice in the republics.
Usually the republics were administered by a combination of Ministers and a First
Secretary of the Party, who were from the titular nationality, and were seconded by
reliable Russians as Deputy Ministers and 2nd Secretaries. The 2nd Secretary and
Deputy Ministers had the real power, controlling personnel, budgets and funding.
A policy of horizontal transfers to other republics was initiated to prevent any local
ties and ensure that the Russian apparatus would be loyal and responsive to Moscow
alone. This policy was modified during the Virgin Lands Project when Moscow
desired more direct control of the Kazakh political process. From 1954 to 1960, both
the 1st and 2nd Secretaries, as well as numerous second rank officials, were Russian.
1. The Kunaev Administration
In 1960, D.A. Kunaev, politically astute, reliable and well connected
became 1st Secretary, thus reestablishing the usual pattern. Kunaev stepped down
in 1962 but was re-elected in 1964,when his old friend L.I. Brezhnev, was chosen as
head of the CPSU. Brezhnev would hold that post until his death in 1982, Kunaev
would hold his until his "retirement" in 1986. During the Brezhnev years, the
republican party elites were extraordinarily stable in their positions of power.
Whether through miscalculation, inattention, or simply poor judgment, the republican
leaders were allowed to entrench themselves, build local power bases, and most
significantly, develop administrations loyal and responsive to the local leadership.
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Over these 18 years the republican governments, unnoticed and unregarded,
developed a sense of nationalism that even spread to the Russian shadow
administration, many of whom were now of local origin.
The Kunaev government was able to develop an effective political
machine at the republic level. Reappointed as 1st Secretary in 1964 and elected to
the CPSU Politburo in 1971 Kunaev had the time the energy and the ambition to
build one of the strongest political machines in the republics. He included both
Kazakhs and Russians in his administration. With influence, patronage and perhaps
other, less savory means, Kunaev gained control of Kazakhstan, not as a Russian
proxy, but as 1st Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party.
Upon the death of Brezhnev in 1982 Yuri Andropov became leader of the
Soviet Union. Concerned with the stagnant economy, declining productivity, all
round inefficiency, graft, corruption and most troubling of all a growing trend towards
nationalism in the republics, Andropov initiated a campaign to clean up the republics
and restore control. By 1984 all five Central Asian republics had experienced large
turnovers of personnel, especially in the state sector. (Hajda, 1990, p. 258) Kunaev
was shocked to find himself losing control of his political organization. L -;.'ation
had been repiaced by retirement, reassignment and transfer, thus reflecting the
original practice of the Central Committee in 1920.
2. The Kolbin Administration
Gorbachev assumed leadership as General Secretary in 1985, and
continued the campaign begun by his predecessors. In 1986 Kunaev, despite
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denigration and criticism from the Central Committee was elected by a divided party
as 1st Party Chairman. He continued in power until December 1986, when he
"retired" from the CPSU Politburo, and was replaced as 1st Secretary by G. Kolbin,
a Russian with no local ties. The manner of his replacement, as much as the fact,
served to enflame Kazakh public opinion and offend a nascent nationalism.
According to Olcott:
On 16 December the Central Committee of the CPK convened to accept
Kunaev's request for retirement and then unanimously chose Gennadiy Kolbin,
the first secretary of the UI'yanovsk obkom, as his replace-ment. Nazarbayev
(the next 1st Secretary) subsequently reported that the plenum lasted 18
minutes. In a February 1990 interview, he characterized the meeting as "in the
worst tradition of stagnation," and he admitted that it led to the serious
demoralization of the CPK and the Kazakh people. (Olcott, 1990, p. 65)
The next day, 17 December, thousands, ten thousand by one account, (Nahaylo and
Swoboda, p. 255) of Kazakh and Russian youths took to the streets of Alma-Ata for
three days of rioting. Reported in official accounts as a few thousand youths doped
on liquor and narcotics, the riots were the first serious expression of nationalistic
discontent in decades. Information after the fact indicates that there were
demonstrations in 12 other regional centers. At least 2191 Komosomol members
were disciplined, and additionally 2 deaths and 200 injuries were reported. (Nahaylo
and Swoboda, 1990, p. 258)
The demonstrations were viewed with great concern by Soviet leadership.
The idea that Soviet educated moslem youth were be in the streets, while Soviet
soldiers were in Afghanistan, was inexplicable. These riots could only be explained
as the acts of hooligans and drunks, Kunaev's henchmen or worst of all, Moslems in
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revolt. It was a measure of the changes in Soviet society that the Alma-Ata riots
were reported at all.
Kolbin attempted to mollify the Kazakhs with renewed sensitivity to
republican issues. He appointed the "Republican Commission on National Issues."
He also declared Kazakh one of the two national languages and announced that he
was learning Kazakh himself. Nonetheless, feelings continued to run high and
nationalism continued to develop in Kazakhstan.
At the 19th Party congress in June 1988, Gorbachev acknowledged
problem areas in the Soviet economy and as part of the solution announced a
sweeping reorganization of the Supreme Soviet. Ostensibly this would ensure better
representation for nationalities. Portentously, in the debate that followed, the
republican leaders clearly championed the extension of republic rights at the expense
of central control. Non-Russian delegates were castigated for putting "one-nation
patriotism" over "Soviet patriotism." (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, p. 307) However
they held firm and the conference resolution on nationalism clearly followed an
agenda giving the republics more autonomy. The delegates voted to recognize that
"urgent measures" must be takes to ensure:
...the further development and consolidation of the Soviet Federation on the
basis of democratic principles. Above all it is a question of the expansion of
the rights of the Union republics and autonomous formations through the
demarcation of the areas of competence of the USSR and the Soviet republics,
decentralization, the transfer to the localities of a number of managerial
functions, and the strengthening of independence and of responsibility in the
economic sphere, social and cultural development, and environmental
protection. (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, p. 308)
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Despite acquiescence and professed good intentions the central authority had not
completely yielded to republican desires. One month later the republics were
shocked to learn that the USSR Supreme Soviet had issued instructions to the
Ministry of the Interior to suppress unauthorized meetings and demonstrations.
Directed at the Baltics, these decrees inflamed opinion in all the republics. (Nahaylo
and Swoboda, 1990, p. 311)
3. The Nazarbayev Administratioa
In June 1989 rioting broke out in western Kazakhstan, reflecting ethnic
strife as unemployed Kazakh youth clashed with settlers from the Northern Caucasus.
(Olcott, 1987, p. 72) Consequently G. Kolbin was removed and replaced by
Nursultan Nazarbayev. As Prime Minister Nazarbayev had been expected to succeed
Kunaev, however these expectations were derailed when Kolbin was sent to
Kazakhstan from Moscow. Never-the-less Nazerbayev was able to build substantial
political and popular support when he refused to participate in the campaigns to
eliminate nationalism and normalize inter-ethnic relations in the wake of the Alma
Ata riots. (FBIS-USR, 4/22/92, p. 62) When Kolbin in his turn resigned, Nazerbayev
assumed power and soon cemented his position by espousing pragmatic economic
and social reforms. He has successfully managed to tread a narrow path between
Russian and Kazakh ethnic groups and between old line communists and radical
democratic reformers.
A solid, practical leader and skillful politician, Nazerbayev demonstrated
his mastery of the art during the crisis over the formation of the Slavic Union.
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Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in dissolved the USSR and in effect formed an alliance
excluding the Central Asian republics. Nazerbayev held his emotions in check and
flew to Moscow to confer with Yeltsin the day before his inauguration as
Kazakhstan's first President. The meeting was evidently unsatisfactory and
Nazerbayev left commenting that "ignoring a republic such as Kazakhstan and
unwarranted emphasis on the 'Slavic factor' constituted a mistake." (FBIS-USR,
4/22/92, p. 63) Shortly thereafter he met with the leaders of four Muslim states in
Ashkhabad where they discussed forming an organization of there own. This
demonstration of political hardball was successful and Kazakhstan along with other
republics was invited to form a new union--the CIS. Nazerbayev has continued his
canny game, always supporting the CIS, an integrated military command and inter-
ethnic harmony and yet occasionally hinting that Kazakhstan might have nuclear
aspirations of its own, establishing independent Kazakhstan armed forces and
replacing the oblast governments with Kazakh presidential representatives loyal to
himself.
Today Nursultan Nazarbayev finds himself in charge of a very different
Kazakhstan than that of any of his predecessors. In 1993 he looks out on a world in
which the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Along the borders of the former USSR
five minor wars are in various stages of resolution. The Communist Party has lost
all credibility and most of its influence. The economic and political structure as well
as the very territorial composition of the Russian Federation is in still in doubt.
30
Kazakhstan, a backwater of the USSR, has become a de facto nuclear power and
taken a step towards center stage in international politics.
In this period of turmoil Kazakhstan must choose wise courses of action
which will thread its way through the rocks and shoals of economic chaos, internal
dissension, potential ethnic conflict, regional instability and staggering environmental
disasters. What courses of action are open a':,d what are their likely effects? Before
attempting to answer these we must understand the current state of affairs in
Kazakhstan.
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111. KAZAKHSTAN TODAY: THE NATION
A. RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMY
Formerly Kazakhstan was a major source of grain for the Soviet Union.
However, production fell significantly in 1991 to 11.9 MMT of grain, about 40% of
the previous years harvest. (FBIS-USR, 4/22/92, p. 58) (TASS, 11/19/91, 1214)
Despite a good grain crop in 1992 the general economic decline continued across all
industries through 1992 and into the present (1993). In the first quarter of 1993
Kazakhstan's State committee on statistics reported that national income was down
16.3% and that the agricultural sector was unable to meet the food requirements of
Kazakhstan. (RFE-RL Daily, 4/30/93) In part the decline in agricultural production
is a result of a drought during the 92-93 growing season. The overall decline in
national income is mostly attributed to the difficulties in the transition to a market
economy as well as to internal difficulties experienced by Kazakhstan's major trading
partner--Russia. It can be expected that as issues of ownership and trading relations
sort themselves out the Kazakh economy will recover. This will undoubtedly be
helped by an increase in production of oil.
After Russia, Kazakhstan has the greatest mineral wealth of any republic in the
former USSR. A major producer of iron, bauxite and non-ferrous metals,
Kazakhstan also has substantial petroleum reserves. Oil and gas offer the greatest
potential for rapid development and high profits, but Kazakhstan is likely to require
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considerable assistance from foreign companies in overcoming the low productivity,
caused by years of mismanagement and outmoded technology. In an attempt to
update production and fully develop the oil and gas reserves, Kazakhstan has actively
sought joint venture programs with free-world countries. The largest of these
programs, and in fact one of the largest joint ventures in the former Soviet Union,
is an effort with Chevron Overseas Petroleum Corporation (COPI), to develop the
Tengiz and adjacent Kovolevskoye oil fields near the Caspian Sea. (The Oil and Gas
Journal, 6/25/91, p. 29(3)) After having been stalled by the August coup attempt
negotiations were reopened Nazarbayev on Sept 17,1991. (Houston Post, 9/17/91,
p. B 3) When the contract was finally signed 6 April, 1993 Chevron and the
government of Kazakhstan had committed themselves to a 40 year joint venture in
which each would invest $10 Billion. Kazakh sources estimate that oil production of
this field will stabilize at 36 million metric tons (MMT) per year (production for
Kazakhstan as a whole is now 25 MMT/year). Total output is estimated at 900
MMT of oil, 55 MMT of propane and 92 MMT of sulfur. Initially the joint
corporation, Tengizchevronoil, will employ about 3200 Kazakhstan nationals. (FBIS-
USR, 4/16/93, p. 86) Western sources estimate a production of 700,000 barrels per
day by 2010, for a total of 6-9 billion barrels of oil recovered out of 25 billion barrels
present. (NYT, 4/7/93, p. C 1) Currently Chevron's world wide production is about
1 million barrels of crude oil per day. In 1992 Kazakhstan also signed contracts with
european firms to jointly develop the Karachaganak gas and condensate fields, which
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with 35 trillion cubic feet of gas/condensate, are reportedly the largest undeveloped
reserves in the world. (The Oil and Gas Journal, 10/28/91, p. 3(2))
In negotiations on the formation of a new political and economic union,
Kazakhstan has agreed to accept 3.86% of USSR debit responsibility, about $2.75
billion. In return Kazakhstan will receive the same percentage of ex-Soviet gold
reserves, about 9.36 metric tons, (Killen, 12/4/9 1, 1446) worth $110 million dollars.
Kazakhstan has also agreed to pursue a coordinated tax policy with other members
of the economic community that is replacing the Soviet Union. (TASS, 9/23/91,
1003)
As political developments in the former USSR are making themselves felt, the
Kazakh economy is adjusting itself to the new world reality. Despite efforts at joint
ventures the Kazakh economy is likely to face difficult times ahead. Almost 97% of
Kazakh trade was with the former Soviet Union. The republic has very little foreign
exchange, and only 27 joint ventures were in operation as of September 1991.
(Knight, 9/23/91, p. 45) The out-flow of skilled technicians will degrade Kazakh
industry and some industries may vanish altogether. For example, in the beginning
of 1991 Kazakhstan voted to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range. Since
then, uranium mining, once a major industry in the republic, has been virtually shut
down. The mines at Shalgi and Tasbulak are closed. The workers, engineers and
technicians have migrated or are seeking other employment. (TASS, 12/2/91, 1037)
While this virtual abolition of an industry is an extreme example, the severe cutbacks
3Calculated at an average world gold price of $366 per oz. troy weight.
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in the Soviet space program will affect the launch complex at Baikonur, and will
similarity affect the technicians, engineers and support staff who work there.
In summary, Kazakhstan is facing a difficult transition to a market economy;
however, it is helped by an abundance of natural resources, which, if given a stable
political environment, may be developed in time to provide sufficient capital to stave
off the worst of the transition period. Transition will be made more difficult by the
almost total reliance on Russia as a trading partner. Because of this "one market
system" Kazakhstan is held hostage to the Russian economy. Conversely, chronic
Russian shortages of grain and other foodstuffs may increase the value of Kazakh
agricultural products. More importantly, after the stabilization of agricultural market
relationships Kazakhstan should still be able to feed itself. On the balance, the
prospects for a prosperous Kazakh economy are guardedly optimistic--if production
is not interrupted by ethnic tension. The resources of Kazakhstan, while not
extravagant, are probably sufficient to enable continued growth and modernization.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT
Throughout Kazakhstan, as in the rest of the former Soviet Union, the bill for
past policies has come due with a vengeance. The land itself has suffered from
reckless and poorly thought out policies. Portions of Kazakhstan near Semipalatinsk
are contaminated with radioactive waste from the nuclear test range. In Kazakhstan,
as in all of Central Asia, brutal farming practices have reduced the fertility of wide
stretches of land, and much of the remaining land has been poisoned by irresponsible
use of chemicals and pesticides. In some areas the use of agricultural chemicals,
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such as the highly toxic defoliant Butifos, has raised the infant mortality rate from
two to three times as high as the national average. (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990, p.
268) Pesticides and chemicals are introduced into the water system by runoff from
irrigated fields. Eventually many of these pesticides make their way to the Aral Sea
with deleterious effects on the populace. In common with Kazakhstan, a province
of Uzbekistan, Karakalpakstan, borders on the Aral Sea. Here according to The
Economist, "...two thirds of the population suffers from liver disorders, typhoid or
cancer of the oesophasus. Infant mortality is among the highest in the world." (The
Economist, 11/4/89, p. 23(3)) It can be assumed that Kazakhs, also living on the
Aral shore, suffer a similar fate; however, their statistics are diluted in the larger
population of Kazakhstan.
The Aral Sea basin may be the world's worst man-made ecological disaster.
Before the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers were diverted to irrigate the Soviet
directed cotton monoculture, the Aral Sea was the worlds fourth largest body of
water. Inefficient methods of irrigation lost almost 40% of the water before it could
be used. This, combined with steadily increasing demands for agricultural needs
drove the demands on the watershed to its limits. By 1986, the flow of the Syr
Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya rivers was essentially entirely consumed with only 1 cubic
kilometer of water reaching the Aral To remain stable the Aral Sea requires 35
cubic kilometers of water a year. (Micklin, 1991, pp. 14-15 ) The Aral has now lost
60% of its volume and 50 feet of its depth. The shoreline has receded 60 miles from
its 1960 level. (The Economist, 1991, p. 59(1)) The last fish died in 1983. The
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dispersion of salty, pesticide contaminated dust, which is blown from the dry lakebed
onto the surrounding fields, is an extremely severe problem. Major storms, some
with plumes of dust as high as 13,000 ft. and dropping dust 245 miles away, were first
seen by Soviet cosmonauts in 1975. (Micklin, 1991, p. 48) "Measurements from 1977
to 1985 indicated that about 43 million metric tons of salt and dust are carried
annually from the sea's dried areas..." Other estimates are lower, however, by the
year 2000 the Aral Sea is still estimated to be depositing 39 million metric tons of
salt and dust on the surrounding fields. (Micklin, 1991, p. 49)
The environment has been altered, the growing season shortened and experts
predict that unless a major effort is made, such as diverting rivers flowing to the
Arctic to the Aral Sea, the cotton fields will be desert by the end of the century. The
sacrifice of the Aral Sea may have been for nothing.
Kazakhstan is fortunate to have sources of water besides the Amu-Darya and
Syr-Darya rivers. Other Central Asian republics are not so lucky. Explosive
population growth, cotton monoculture, a general reduction in arable land due to
primitive farming practices, and salting from poor irrigation techniques will make the
distribution of water between the republics the most divisive issue of the next
century. Except as a potential supplier Kazakhstan should be uninvolved. With care




Despite, or perhaps because of Russian attempts to clean up the Kunaev party
apparatus, the Kazakhstan Political machine has remained relatively intact. While
corruption and mismanagement were endemic under Kunaev, the average Kazakh
felt that the party was looking after his best interests as well as could be expected.
The "Huey Long" of Kazakhstan, Kunaev left a well oiled, smoothly functioning
political machine, which would outlast his successor and the Communist party as well.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanying loss of legitimacy by
the Communist Party, enabled the formation of competing political parties. Not as
large, well organized or as well funded, they have yet to have a large impact on
Kazakhstan political life. There influence is likely to grow as they address key issues
such as economic policy and ethnic rights. The unstable nature of Kazakhstan
politics makes any definitive party structure difficult to pin down, however in the
Presidential elections of 1991 these parties were participants:
Kazakhstan Socialist Party Renamed from the CPK, the KSP is the largest and
best funded of Kazakhstan political parties. Tarred with the failures of the past,
the KSP still represents, in many minds, the only party capable of leading the
country. Their platform includes support for formation of a "presidential structure
from the top down," (FBIS-USR, 4/17/91, p. 81) limited privatization, with the
land to belong to the state and be given to citizens for use during their lifetime,
economic reform with market determination of prices, creation of a Kazakh
currency, (Ljunggren, 11/30/91, 0938) and a policy of ethnic cooperation. The
KSP also supports independence, which is interpreted as autonomy within a
confederation with Russia. (Ljunggren, 12/2/91, 0634) The KSP has a broad, but
perhaps not deep, base of support from all ethnic groups. It can expect to keep
this level of support, as long as it is seen as the party which can deliver the goods
and manage change successfully. Should this change the KSP can expect to
answer for CPK sins.
Regubliean Party No data yet available.
38
Independent Trade Union of Entrepreneurs. Lease Holders and Coonerators
No data yet available.
Civil Movement (Azat) Seeks to protect and advance the status of ethnic Kazakhs.
Azat supports laws restricting immigration and is pro a slow privatization which
wv.1 •4 reserve 50% of industry ownership for ethnic Kazakhs. Azat "demands the
return of what is their own," and frequently collaborates with the Zhelotoksan
(December) party and the Social Democrats. (FBIS-USR, 4/24/92, pp. 79-80)
Unity (Yedinstvo) An inter-ethnic party which has criticized Nazarbayev for
neglecting the needs of non-Kazakh inhabitants. (TASS, 11/25/91, 1604) Unity
can be expected to remain a critical ally of the KSP for lack of alternatives.
National Democratic Party (Zheltoksan) Headed by Amanzhol Nelabayev and
Khossen Munzakhmentov. It was founded from three informal groups interested
in promoting ideas and preservation of Kazakh culture. Platform supports
development and strengthening of native Kazakh cultures and Kazakh control of
the republic. Holds independence as a desirable future goal. (Olcott, 1990, p. 75)
National Indeunendence Party (Alash) Headed by Bulatbek Akhmet-Ali. An
Islamic nationalist party which seeks early independence, promotion of Islam,
primacy of Kazakh culture and Kazakh control of the republic. Allied with
"Turkestan," a group based in Tashkent, which supports the creation of a Central
Asian confederation of which Kazakhstan would be a part. Opponents have
accused Alash of arming its followers and preparing to use force to achieve
political goals. (Olcott, 1990, p. 76)
Kazakhstan Bolshevik Party Based on the All-Union Communist Bolshevik Party
(VKP). October 8 1991 statement by the Kazakhstan Organizing Committee,
condemned reforms and called for the resignation of Nazarbayev. (TASS,
11/27/91, 1022) Little real support and little real hope for popular support.
Oranization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan More properly a lobby
than a party, the Organization is trying to get the eastern oblasts declared
autonomous and exempted from the Kazakhstan language laws. (Olcott, 1990, p.
76) Potential for large support from non-Kazakhs in border regions and
transformation into a separatist movement.
On December 1, 1991 Kazakhstan held its first free presidential election.
Where despite a ferment of newly formed parties no one ran against Nazarbayev.
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In the best of traditions of machine politics voters were lured to the polls by an
abundance of normally scarce supplies such as sausages, vegetables and cigarettes.
In a news conference after the election, Nazarbayev reaffirmed his commitment
to the platform of the KSP, and re-emphasized that in his interpretation the people
had voted for "independence and not to split the nation...two different things."
(Ljunggren, 12/2/91, 0634) Disturbingly Nazarbayev sounded the authoritarian note
which his critics have cautioned of, when he warned opposition parties that
"Democracy is first and foremost discipline and obeying laws," and that "we have laws
on political parties and meetings. If we see these laws are being broken and conflicts
started, we will have to take extremely strong measures...." (Ljunggren, 12/2/91,
0634)
D. MILITARY RESOURCES
The National Guard of Kazakhstan by decree of President Nursultan
Nazarbayev March 16, 1992. Slightly over one year a navy was similarly established
on 2 April, 1993. While on paper the creation of national armed forces is a relatively
effortless process, their development into an effective fighting force will be a great
deal more difficult. Unlike several of the other new republics Kazakhstan faces a
severe shortage of trained officers and Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs).
Both Ukraine and Georgia were able to nationalize troops from the Ministry
of the Interior (MVD) and ex-Soviet troops stationed on their soil. The effective
control of these troops was made possible by large numbers of Ukrainian and
Georgian officers, NCOs and experienced servicemen. In addition to members of
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their own nationality, they were assisted by significant numbers of Russian
servicemen willing to swear an oath of allegiance to the new republic. Neither of
these conditions exist in Kazakhstan. There are not significant numbers of Kazakh
officers and NCOs, nor are there very many Kazakh enlisted men in combatant units.
As a matter of convenience and unwritten policy, Central Asians4 were not
routinely been assigned to front-line combatant units in the Soviet Army. In part,
this was due their generally low levels of proficiency in the Russian language. Other
contributing factors were ethnic prejudice and some doubts about the political
reliability of the "blacks," (as the Central Asians were called). In combatant units,
the reported ratio of Slavs to non-Slavs was about 70%; of these Central Asians were
reported to compose about 5% of the non-Slavic ethnic groups. Central Asians were
much less in evidence in the more highly technical services, the Strategic Rocket
Forces, the Air Force and the Navy. (Alexiev and Wimbush, 1988, pp. 143-144)
Even when serving in combatant units, Central Asians appeared to receive less
training and more assignments to non-combat roles such as cook, manual laborer,
and so on.
While non-Slavic representation was low in the combatant units, the ratios
reversed themselves in two particular non-combatant areas, the construction
battalions (Stroibat), and more importantly, the internal security forces, the MVD.
Central Asians were reported to have comprised about 50% of stroibat and MVD
enlisted strength.
'Some Soviet literature excludes Kazakhstan from the definit;on of Central Asia. The more recent
usage, which is followed in this study, includes Kazakhstan as a part of Central Asia.
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"MVD," (Ministersvo Vnuitrenykh Del) refers to troops under command of the
USSR Ministry of the Interior. Their primary function was to maintain internal
security and order. The majority of the MVD were trained and equipped as
mechanized infantry with the addition of some few armor units. (Alexiev and
Wimbush, 1980, p. 149)
The vast majority of officers and NCOs in the Soviet army were of Slavic origin.
By one estimate there were only 3000 ethnic Kazakh commissioned officers. Fifty
of these were Colonels, but none of those were in direct command roles. (FBIS-
USR, 5/15/92, p. 89) This lack of trained Kazakh officers and NCOs, as well as the
underrepresentation of Kazakhs in combat units and technical services, makes it
unlikely that the Kazakhstan National Guard can be brought to a high level of
combat effectiveness in the near future. Any Kazakh armed forces would initially
be devoid of trained supporting arms, such as artillery, air defense, communications
and radio-electronic warfare. Undoubtedly, a period of training and preparation will
be necessary before the Kazakh army can become minimally effective. This will
more certainly apply to Air Force and Naval units.
Kazakhstan is one of four republics, which in addition to Russia, Belarus and
Ukraine have strategic nuclear weapons. About 1250 warheads are in Belarus, a
reported 1240 strategic warheads in Ukraine and 1800 warheads in Kazakhstan.
(Schmidt, 12/6/91, p. A 7, col. 1) CIS troops in Kazakhstan may also have
significant numbers of tactical nuclear weapons available. All three non-Russian
republics have emphasized that they do not seek exclusive control of the strategic
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nuclear weapons; however, each has demanded - veto over any perspective use.
(TASS, 11/30/91, 1005) Ukraine has repeatedly insisted that it desires
"comprehensive elimination of all nuclear weapons from its territory in the shortest
possible time." (Vasilenko, 11/16/91, p. 19) Ukraine has also repeatedly raised the
subject of monetary compensation and security guarantees. (FBIS-USR, 4/5/93, pp.
66-70) Some deputies to parliament have suggested that these guarantees be
combined with admittance to NATO or a permanent seat on the U.N. Security
Council. (FBIS-USR, 1993, p. 88) Kazakhstan, also raised the issues of national
security in the disposition of nuclear weapons. In an interview with ABC on
September 16, 1991, Nazarbayev stated: "I am absolutely against having any single
republic control all nuclear weapons by itself, irrespective of how large that republic
might be." (McManus, 9/17/91, p. A 8, col. 1) This position, clearly referring to
Russia, was possibiy formed during the August coup, or in light of the Yeltsin
administration's frank statements suggesting that under some conditions borders were
subject to unilateral revision. (New York Times International, 8/27/91, p. A 7)
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IV. THE KAZAKH PEOPLE
A. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
The Kazakh people have been repeatedly driven almost to extinction. They
required 75 years to recover from their loss of one third of their population after the
Kalmyk invasion of 1723-1725. Later, under the Russians, the Kazakhs endured wave
after wave of disasters. It is estimated by the demographer M. Tatimov (FBIS-USR,
1992, pp. 117-119) that during the uprising of 1916 and the ensuing upheavals of
Revolution and Civil War, 7-8% of the population migrated and 18-19% died.
During the period of Collectivization, Tatimov estimates that an additional 18%
migrated and a further 51-52% died. In other words, the population of Kazakhstan
was reduced by almost 70%. He notes that the Kazakhs also suffered 350,000
military losses during WW II (by comparison, U.S. losses were 292,000 battle deaths)
and that the population of ethnic Kazakhs in 1916 was not matched until 1976, a 60
year recovery rate.5
Today, for the first time since Collectivization the Kazakh people have become
the largest segment of the population in Kazakhstan. Analysis of demographic and
social trends, indicates that this is likely to continue for several reasons, and that the
ethnic Kazakhs will gain increased weight as a major factor in the political and
-Other sources, such as the excellent work by Robert Conquest, "Harvest of Sorrow," have slightly
lower estimates of the overall casualty rate; however, the Kazakhs themselves tend to accept the higher
estimates of local demographers.
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cultural life of Kazakhstan. First, the rate of natural increase of the Kazakh people
is quite large. In data from 1978 the average Russian family consisted of 3.2
members, but the Kazakhs averaged 5.5 members. In the same survey young
Russian women expressed a desire for an average of 2.2 children, while young
Kazakh women hoped for 4.85. In Kazakhstan between 1979 and 1989, the Kazakh
population increased by 23.5%, while the Russian population increased by 3.9%.
(Conquest, 1986, pp. 262-264) Second, in addition to the rate of natural increase, a
possibility exists for the return migration of large numbers of Kazakhs living in other
areas. There could possibly be as many as 1.6 million emigrants from within the
Russian Federation, and perhaps an even larger number from across the border in
China. Third, there is an increasing rate of departure for non-ethnic Kazakhs.
Data from the 1989 Soviet census, (Hajda and Beissinger, 1990, pp. 262-263)
lists the population of Kazakhstan as 16.5 million. In the total population, the ethnic
Kazakhs accounted for 6.5 million (39%). The Russians numbered 6.2 million and
were 37.5% of the population. The demographer A. Ghaliyev (FBIS-USR, 4/24/93,
pp. 81-83) estimated that by 1 Jan 1992, if the effects of migration/emigration were
to be disregarded, the proportion of Kazakhs would rise to 41% while the proportion
of Russians would remain at about 37%. This was due to reports that while the rate
of natural increase for ethnic Kazakhs had remained about the same, the rate of
natural increase for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians had dropped by nearly
50% fhom 1989 to 1991. Tatimov also comments on this phenomenon and estimates
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that allowing for the return of ethnic Kazakhs from outside the country, by 2002 the
Kazakhs will be an absolute majority.
Migration is a serious factor in the demographics of Kazakhstan. Between 1989
and 1991, ethnic Kazakhs were the only group with a positive balance of migrants.
Data from Ghaliyev (FBIS-USR, 4/24/93, p. 81), indicates that 57,712 Kazakhs
arrived but that 282,719 members of other ethnic groups departed. Despite the
overall negative balance of the slavic population growth, in some oblasts the
numbers of Russians, Ukrainians and other non-Kazakhs are increasing. In
particular, the rich northern tier of oblasts, Qostanay (Kustanay), K6kshetac
(Kokchetav), Aqmola (Akmola), North Kazakhstan and Pavlodar have seen an
increase of 56,600 from 1989 to 1992. These settlers are arriving from Russia and
many newly independent republics where Russians are no longer welcome, including
Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia and Uzbekistan. (FBIS-USR, 4/24/93, p. 81) This
increase in the non-Kazakh population of these already heavily slavic oblasts may
strengthen the secessionist movements, and in the case of ethnic conflicts, increase
the likelihood of conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan.
B. THE WORKPLACE
Kazakhstan as a whole reflects the trends of modernization and urbanization
found throughout Central Asia, (Simon, 1991, p. 391) but compared to the rest of the
population, the ethnic Kazakh lag behind in urbanization and remain fairly rural.
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TABLE I. PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION TO TOTAL
POPULATION IN KAZAKHSTAN
S1926 1939 19S9 1979
KSSR 9 28 44 54
Kazakhs 2.2 1.6 24 32
As a whole, the work force shows a consistent trend away from the rural, and
towards the industrialized sectors. Table II, extracted from sources quoted in Simon,
(Simon, 1991, p. 273 and p. 321) shows this apparent trend. In this data a significant
portion of the agricultural work force, the workers on the sovkhoz (mechanized
farms), are included as blue collar workers. This is only broken out 1959, where we
see that while 50% of the blue collar, industrial, work force is listed as ethnic
Kazakh, 44% of these are working in sovkhoz. In the absence of hard data it seems
a reasonable supposition that a significant portion of the ethnic Kazakh populace still
remains in a rural lifestyle.
TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR IN THE KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMY
Blue Collar White Collar Kolkhoz
Total Kazakh Total Kazakh Total Kazakh
1939 33.8 25.6 17.4 8 47.5 60.8
1959 58 50 21 16 21 40
1970 65 44/6* 22 13
1979 64 28 8
*In 1959 the titular nationality, the Kazakh, were broken out in the Blue Collar category by sub-
categories of workers in the sovkhoz and in industry, in this case 44% and 6%. In subsequent
years sovkhoz work.7s were lumped together with other industrial, blue collar workers. This has
the effect of masking a portion of the Kazakh rural workers.
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C. EDUCATION
The overall levels of education in Kazakhstan have continued to rise. In
general, the non-Kazakh Slavic minorities appear to reflect the levels of education
found in Russia as a whole. On the other hand, the Kazakh people have a lower
standard of education, but they have also shown significant gains. Statistics available
for 1927, 1960 and 1980 show a steady increase in the number of college students,
per 10,000 population. College students increased from .3 per 10,000 in 1927, to
112.6 in 1960 and to 237.2 in 1980. (Simon, 1991, p. 406) The number of Kazakhs
with a 7 year education was 22 per 1000 in 1939. In 1959 the number of Kazakhs
(per 1000 people over 10 years of age) had risen to 282 and in 1970 this number was
403. (Simon, 1991, p. 267) While these levels may seem low by western standards,
they represent a triumph for the Soviet system in Central Asia. They have provided
Kazakhstan with a populace capable of continuing the development and
modernization of Kazakhstan.
D. RELIGION
The currents of Islam in Kazakhstan are uncertain in their course. Permitted
but discouraged under Soviet rule, Kazakh Islamic believers are described by Olcott
(Hajda and Beissinger, 1990, p. 270) as falling into three categories. First there are
"Ethnic Muslims" who are Islamic by birth but not necessarily by practice. They have
no real •,entification with global Islamic movements or with the goals of Islamic
states. They would define themselves as "Muslim" because it is perceived as a
characteristic of their ethnic group, though it may not necessarily be part of their
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individual belief system. Under this definition one could be both an Atheist and a
Muslim. Second there are "Cultural Muslims," those who adhere to the practice of
Islam without knowledge or understanding of its doctrines. These could be expected
to support Islam, at least insofar as it is seen as reflecting a unifying principal for the
Kazakh people. In this group there is probably little real sympathy for the goals of
Islamic movements and states. However, because of a familiarity with Islam and an
associa-tion with the clergy, this group may provide a fertile ground for education
and conversion to more militant forms of Islam. Lastly there are "Doctrinal
Muslims." These are the smallest group but possibly the most vital and with the
potential for the most growth. In this group a strong belief system combined with
knowledge of Islamic practice and doctrine, reinforces the traditionally proselytizing
nature of Islam. New converts and the accession of disaffected Kazakh youth, joined
as well by members from the cultural and ethnic Muslims, will probably enlarge this
group. They can be expected to have a strong nationalistic agenda and some
identification with world Islamic movements.
In an analysis by Yaacov R'oi, there appears to be three main types of Islamic
practice in Kazakhstan. These types do not necessarily coincide completely with the
three groups defined above, although the congruences are obvious. First and most
visible, there is Official Islam. Sanctioned by the Soviet government and served by
a formal clergy, official Islam is administered by Directorates set up in Tashkent,
Baku, Makhachkala and Ufa in 1943, and in Kazakhstan in 1990. The leaders of
official Islam have walked a tightrope between a compromise of belief and
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cooperation with the regime. Perhaps somewhat tainted by cooperation with the
government, the support received by the leadership tLas not been excessive. In 1990,
a number of mosques were reopened and 15 new mosques were registered bringing
the total number of mosques in Kazakhstan to 63. (R'oi, 1990, p. 51) Secondly there
is Unofficial Islam; non-establishment and non-orthodox, it is practiced on a personal
basis. The lack of mosques in Kazakhstan has resulted in a decentralized practice
spread at the grass roots level. This decentralization, combined with a resistance to
secularization and a nationalist approach, has strengthened Unofficial Islam much
as similar conditions did in the wake of the first Russian conquest. A significant
portion of unofficial Islam in kazakhstan has proven receptive to the Sufi branch of
Islamic thought. A single sufi brotherhood or Tariqa, is a tightly organized group
with a rigid hierarchy, usually recruited vertically in one clan. (Simon, 1990, p. 347)
This organization of brotherhoods may play a major role in the preservation and
strengthening of traditional forms in Kazakh culture. The Sufi influence has been
further strengthened by the admission of women to the Tariqas. Sufi preachers have
earned credibility and influence with both the youth and the intelligentsia, by their
early and consistent opposition to Soviet rule. Lastly there is a large body of
religious activity, too vaguely related to Islam to be claimed as formal religion, but
termed "folk practices." This is a melange of both Islamic and local cultural
practices. While not very important in and of itself, this melange may serve as a
springboard for more organized religion.
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It appears that Islam, as a central theme in Kazakh culture, serves to unify the
Kazakhs and preserve their communal particularism. As one writer noted:
Islamic burial rites and circumcision are widely observed by both believers and
non-believers. In fact religious and national identity are inseparable for many
Soviet Muslims, and "the repudiation of religion and the old traditions is
interpreted as a repudiation of one's nationality." (Karkiins, 1986, p. 195)
Currently Islam is not a morally overwhelming force among the Kazakh people.
However, Islam may offer the Kazakhs an attractive religious and socially organizing
belief system in the tumultuous times ahead.6
E. SOCIETY
Despite attacks on Kazakh social patterns during Collectivization and during
the subsequent years under Soviet rule, this increasingly urbanized society retains its
cultural links to Central Asian kinship patterns. The same patterns discussed in part
one, pp. 10-12 and pp. 19-20 persist today. Note the similarity in the situations in
1928 and 1931 to those discussed by Krader in 1949 and 1959:
Asia's Sovietization was frequently only a formality: traditional Islamic and
tribal institutions received Soviet labels. The plenum of the Turkmen CC
stated in May 1928: "In vast majority of cases, the Party cells in the auls of the
raion Merv are groups of aksakals.
The inventory of Central Asia says: "In most cases...the secretaries of the
village Soviets were sons of bais, traders and clergymen. (Bennigsen and
Wimbush, p. 104) (Simon, 1991, p. 347)
In Kirgizia, one kolkhoz, Kzyl Oktyabr, Red October, consisted of five villages
in 1949. In the settlements, the kinship system is the basis of social
'Works by Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush such as "Muslims of the Soviet Empire"
and "Mystics and Commissars" are especially useful in understanding Islam in the former Soviet Union.
Also useful is a particularly insightful article by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Islam and Nationalism:
Central Asia and Kazakhstan Under Soviet Rule."
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organization. In one settlement 17 families of the Aranzhanlineage live; the
Kaiduulat lineage is settled in two villages .... The Kazakh collective farm system
and villages are organized along lines which parallel the Kirgiz system. To a
certain extent the Kazakh and Kirgiz social systems are the same....Among the
present-day Kazakhs, clan-affiliation of each man is known. Not only the old,
but boys of 10 or 12 years know their ancestry. They identify themselves by
their village as in former times, although the kolkhoz name replaces the aul
designation. (Krader, 1962, pp. 165-166)
These are echoed in modem studies by Bennigsen in 1980 also quoted in Simon.
(Simon, 1991, p. 316)
Although the tribal loyalties of the former Central Asian nomads have become
less pronounced, they have not disappeared. In many cases, the tribes' and
clans' feelings of solidarity have joined in a close and "fruitful" symbiosis with
the career patterns of Soviet apparatuses. The Islamic peoples' cultural
traditions...legitimize the widely prevalent practice of "rope parties," "patron,"
and "clientele." As a result, members of the Great Horde (Ulu luz) hold many
prominent positions in the Kazakh Party and state apparatus.
The patrilineal kinship patterns of family-tribe-clan appear to have made the
transition to the modem world. In 1980, a dissident Soviet writer on internal exile
in Yermak, Kazakhstan, noted the competition between ethnic group and the
importance of the clan in Kazakh life. (Karklins, 1986, p. 29)
Kazakhstan (at any rate Yermakov region) is riddled with ethnic barriers,
although the authorities fail to acknowledge it: they try to appear neutral. Any
acquaintance begins with a question about one's nationality, unless this is clear
from the color of one's skin or the shape of one's eyes. The support of one's
"clan" is considered the ethical basis of life and to violate this is a moral
transgression even in the eyes of the passive members of an ethnic community.
In his article "A Time Rich in Hope and Full of Doubt," A. Ghaliyev (FBIS-USR,
4/24/93, pp. 81-83) also commented on the resurgence of clan and even horde (orda)
groupings.
Starting in 1960, we began to observe isolation by region and by clan or
community among Kazakhstan Kazakhs. This tendency was particularly
noteworthy during the years 1986-1992. Ethnic interests and likewise local
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political structures and an active subjectivism have begun to appear in every
clan and community region....More specifically, isolation by horde, region or
oblast in the republic is going forward as a matter of necessity.
It appears that privatization and the reorganization of market relationships may have
the effect of strengthening the traditional structures. Again from the same source:
While the regionalization of Kazakhstan has been taking place fundamentally
within the scope of the three hordes, there is nothing surprising in this. The
capitals of the 19 oblasts have connections to classifications into the three
hordes. Economic self-management and a cultural infrastructure will come into
being in each oblast and likewise within each oblast association.
The patrilineal extended family model, linked by genealogies in the concentric
circles of expanding loyalties, is a firm fixture of Kazakh society. If past history is an
example, the present upheavals will only serve to strengthen these ties.
Paradoxically, this source of strength to the Kazakh people may weaken the Kazakh
nation. The same concentric circles of kinship, which enclose and support the
Kazakh, exclude and deny the Slavic settlers. The reorganization of political and
economic relationships based on horde and clan relationships threatens to completely
exclude the non-Kazakh. Unless the settlers, fewer than 1% of which speak Kazakh,
can be brought into full participation in Kazakh society, ethnic conflicts are certain
to be exacerbated.
F. ETHNIC RELATIONS
Potentially the most severe and explosive problem facing Kazakhstan, ethnic
relations may also be the most intractable of solution. The concentration of Slavs
in the border oblasts, where Kazakhs are in a distinct minority, and the lack of
assimilation by Slavs into Kazakh society and culture, (less than 1% of non-Kazakhs
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speak Kazakh) almost ensure that ethnic relations will be in conflict. Kazakh
resentment of Slavic settlers has fueled every revolt since the Tsarist conquest. Were
the Slavs to make every effort, which is unlikely, to integrate into the Kazakh nation,
acceptance may still be extremely difficult to achieve. Memories from the holocaust
of collectivization and lingering resentments from the dispossession of Kazakhs by
Russian settlers may prove to be insurmountable obstacles.
What then will happen to the settlers? It cannot be imagined that 6.2 million
Russian settlers will return quietly to Russia. Denied acceptance or equal footing in
the Kazakh nation, groups such as The Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern
Kazakhstan and political action committees in the northern oblasts will become the
core of a separatist movement. 7 It is equally inconceivable that the Kazakhs would
peacefully suffer loss of their most fertile border provinces. Conflict and violence
seem almost inevitable.
Just as a mutually beneficial trading relationship would serve to draw the
Kazakhs and Russians closer, the question of Russian minority rights could serve to
divide them. Russia is likely to prove ready to protect and advance the rights of
ethnic Russians when it perceives an advantage or moral obligation to do so.
On August 27, the President of Russia issued a warning since publicly retracted.
Pavel Voshchanov, speaking for Yeltsin, specifically referred to areas of northern
'Alexander Solzhenitsyn in "Rebuilding Russia," translated by Alexis Klimoff, refers to Kazakhstan
as "a huge territory that was stitched together in a haphazard fashion: wherever migrating herds made
a yearly passage." He offers to let the Kazakhs take their "long-standing ancestral domains along the
large arc of lands in the south," and separate with Godspeed. Presumably, the northern portion of the
"inflated territory of Kazakhstan" which was "transformed and built up by the Russians" would remain
in Russia.
54
Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, when he declared that Russia reserved the right to
review its borders with any republic that left the union:
If these republics enter the union with Russia it is not a problem, but if they
go, we must take care of the population that lives there and not forget that
these lands were settled by Russians. Russia will hardly agree to give away
these territories just like that. (New York Times International, 8/27/91, p. A
7)
Subsequently the statement was clarified, modified and eventually retracted; however,
recent events suggests that the original meaning was clear and sincere.
Moldovia accused Soviet troops of occupying areas populated by ethnic
Russians and distributing hundreds of weapons to extremists. It was claimed that
soldiers of the Soviet 14th Army, "with tacit agreement of the central Soviet
authorities were arming separatists," and that "Soviet soldiers are using threats and
physical violence on all those who want to take part in the elections." (Reuter Wire,
12/6/91, 1231) Georgia accused Moscow of creating an "artificial" problem in South
Ossetia which was blamed on the "imperial policy o; Moscow." Russian intervention
was blamed for exacerbating the problem and it was claimed that if it were not for
the 500,000 Ministry of the Interior (MVD) troops in the area the problerrs would
have been solved in weeks. (TASS, 12/6/91, 1454)
This must give pause to Nazarbayev. Ethnic relations have long been strained
in Kazakhstan, from the riots in Novyy Uzen in June of 1989, when unemployed
Kazakh youths clashed with Slavic settlers, to more recent incidents in Alma-Ata,
where a Russian journalist claimed that, "Russians are getting beaten up on buses
just for being Russian." (Ljunggren, 12/30/91, 0938) Despite the best efforts of the
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Kazakh government there is not much cause for optimism that ethnic tensions can
be kept under control without repressive measures.
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V. FOUNDATIONS OF KAZAKHSTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY
In the accomplishment of national interests Kazakh foreign policy must resolve
three important relationships. First and foremost, Kazakhstan must resolve its
relationship with Russia. Secondly, it must reach some sort of accommodation with
China, and lastly it must achieve stability within the framework of relations with the
Central Asian republics.
A. FRAMEWORK FOR RUSSIAN.KAZAKH RELATIONS
No discussion of the future of Kazakhstan can proceed without consideration
of the final form of the successor to the USSR. Whether it be Federal, Confederate,
Commonwealth or complete dissolution, Kazakhstan's ielations with the world are
determined by its relations with the successor to the Soviet Union. As the animal
trainer explained to the ringmaster, "When you start dancing with the bear you can't
quit until the bear gets tired." Just so does Kazakhstan also find its boundaries of
action circumscribed by the bear.
1. The Soviet Successor State
Three basic possibilities exist for a Soviet successor state. First, there is
the possibility that there will be no successor organization. Unable to agree on a
form of union, the former USSR may dissolve into the constituent republics, and
some unspecified number of former Autonomous Republics. In such a case, formal
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relations would be regulated through bilateral agreements dealing with commerce,
transportation, defence and other areas of common interest.
Second, there is a possibility that the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) will become an effective unifying force. The CIS was proposed by the
President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, in a speech to the Belarus parliament on
Dccember 7, 1991. After declaring that 'Today we see the failure of the idea of a
half-federation, half-confederation," he suggested that Russia and Ukraine were
moving towards a compromise based on the Ukrainian proposal for a
"commonwealth modeled on the European Community." (Morrison, 12/7/91, 0929)
Trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus produced an agreement to form
a "Union of Independent States (UIS)," which later became the CIS. The CIS has
the stated intent of:
...developing equal arid mutually beneficial cooperation of the peoples and
states, [in addition] it has been decided to conclude special agreements in the
sphere of politics, the economy, culture, education, public health, science, trade,
the environment and other fields.
A statement was made pledging respect for the territorial integrity of the states that
have signed the agreement, for the inviolability and open nature of existing borders
and for freedom of movement. (Reuter Wire, 12/12/91, 1709) Membership in the
CIS is open to states that share the same "aims and principles."
The CIS has not yet jelled into an effective organization. Economic policy
and tariffs are only partially coordinated between members and perhaps more
seriously disagreements have arisen in matters of defense policy. In December 1991
the signatories pledged to preserve "unified command of a common military-strategic
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space," and "united control over nuclear weapons." Eighteen months later concrete
methods for economic cooperation had yet to be worked out and Russia went on the
record reversing it's previous stance concerning the armed forces. At the 13 May
1993 meeting, which was attended by the Defense Ministers of nine of the CIS
member states, Russia, in opposition to the other members present, opposed the
creation of unified CIS forces in peacetime. Russia also claimed that it was the sole
inheritor of nuclear weapons from the former USSR and it opposed CIS command
over nuclear forces. Kazakhstan and Ukraine disagreed with these assertions and
maintained that the original Minsk agreement, which established CIS control of
nuclear weapons, is still valid. (RFE-RL Daily Report, 5/14/93)
The preoccupation of Russia with internal problems has led to a lessening
of Russian influence in the southern tier of Central Asian states and encouraged a
matching expansion of Turkish and Iranian influence. Not much encouragement was
needed. When Russia threatened to blockade the mountainous enclave of Chechen-
Ingushetia, Turkey sent $9 million worth of food through Georgia. (AP Wire,
11/14/91, p. 719) Iran has announced that it will help Azerbaijan build a rail link,
through Iranian territory, to the Nakhichevan Republic dependency which is
separated from Azerbaijan by Armenia. (TASS, 12/4/91, 0911) On December 5,
the Acting Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, the Personal Envoy of the Azerbaijani
President and the Transcaucasian Moslems Spiritual Committee Leader, flew in the
Iranian Foreign Ministers personal airplane, to participate as observers at a meeting
of Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers. (TASS, 12/5/91, 1002) One commentator
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has observed that Iran is "employing the politics of self-interest," because "Teheran
is concerned about Ankara's ability to stir trouble through its friends in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan and fears that Turkish allies in those republics would establish states
allied with Turkey." (Zein, 11/1/91, p. 21)
Lastly, there is the chilling possibility of a successful second coup.
Rumors are a Russian national pastime; however, when Shevardnadze warns of
"nostalgia for a strong hand," and when Mayor Popov of Moscow cautions against an
uprising of the "destitute, lumpen section of the population," (Dobbs, 12/6/91)
careful observers must take them seriously. The Mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly
Sobchak, would not rule out a military coup in an interview with Le Figaro. He
spoke of a "chance of success for a military dictatorship with an aim of simply
restoring order." (Reuter Wire, 12/4/91, 0643) An article in the armed forces
newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, predicted "social cataclysm" if President Yeltsin went
ahead with his reforms. "When people reach the limits of their despair, the army--if
it has not fallen apart--will say its piece," wrote sociologist Tatyana Koryagina in the
same newspaper. (Boulton, 12/4/91, 0946) In November Andrei Zubov predicted
in Literaturnaya Gazeta that; "the Soviet Union is most likely in for some form of
authoritarian regime in the near future...chances are that it will be a civilian-military
bureaucratic government." He speculates that the non-Russian periphery will scatter
as it has before, and then hints that this will be followed by re-consolidation under
a healthy, powerful, authoritarian center. (Zubov, 11/1/91, pp. 20-22) Indeed, given
a winter of hunger, support for a coup might be strong among the population if it
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gave hope it could resolve problems of production and distribution. Restoration of
central control is a real possibility, at least in Russia proper. As happened in 1917,
the individual republics can be expected to assert and attempt to maintain their
indepen-dence, especially in the face of a renewed bureaucratic dictatorship.
Regardless of the final form of the successor to the USSR Kazakhstan
must still, first and foremost come to terms with Russia. Kazakhstan can exist in one
of two basic forms of relationship with Russia-in some form of close alliance, with
integrated economies and reasonably open borders; or as an entity totally separate
from Russia, perhaps as a member of some other alliance system, with closed borders
and bilateral, formal relations.
2. Kazakhstan In A Close Relationship With Russia
As a nation in close alliance with Russia (perhaps as a member of the
CIS, or secure in some form of bilateral agreement) most of Kazakhstan's security
concerns which do not involve Russia would disappear; but Kazakhstan might still
have substantial concerns concerning Russia itself. Just as occurred in 1922, a
renewed Russian imperialism could turn any close relationship into a deadly
embrace. Therefore, a prudent republic would maintain some "reasonable
sufficiency" of defensive forces for its own protection. In addition to this, Russian
security concerns would also become concerns for Kazakhstan. Strategic weapons
placed in Kazakhstan for reasons of Russian security are targets for all that.
Internal problems might be alleviated by a close relationship with Russia.
Concerns over trade, communications and transportation could be better resolved.
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Fears of the ethnic Russians might be allayed by a Kazakh-Russian alliance; however,
this same alliance might exacerbate the fears of native Kazakhs. Freedom of
movement between Russia and Kazakhstan or within the CIS might be seen as a
license for unrestricted immigration. Special agreements respecting the rights of
Russians in education and culture might be seen as unacceptably damaging to the re-
assertion of the Kazakh culture. On the other hand a close relationship with Russia
might give the government of Kazakhstan a free hand in dealing with unrest among
the Russian minority.
If reason were to prevail, Kazakhs could logically expect that their own
improved education and economic prospects, combined with their high birth rate,
would serve, with time, to fulfill their ethnic ambitions; however, other minority
groups may see these objective facts as threatening developments which demand
some sort of resolution.
3. Kazakhstan In A Non-Cooperative Relationship With Russia
As a separate, non-cooperating nation, Kazakhstan may find its internal
problems aggravated. Aside from the difficulties associated with the resolution of
various economic issues and the status of nuclear weapons, relationships between the
two nations might be strained by ethnic problems internal to Kazakhstan. In the
steady stream of immigration to the north one already sees evidence of "a last
lifeboat on the Titanic" syndrome among the Russian settlers. Official figures
indicate that between 1989 and 1991 about 58,000 Kazakhs returned to Kazakhstan
while almost 282,000 non-Kazakhs. Additionally some 57,000 Russians and
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Ukrainians relocated to the northern border oblasts, increasing the already heavy
preponderance of non-Kazakhs. In the event of severe ethnic strife, almost
unavoidably the settlers would attempt to take the border oblasts, where Russians are
in a majority, out of Kazakhstan, and into Russia, joining with the neighboring
Russian oblasts. These are some of the richer areas in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh
government would have to be very persuasive, to reassure the settlers, or very careful
in its use of force to resolve the issue. It may be doubted, that the Kazakh
government could act effectively without providing excuses that would allow, or
reasons that would compel, Russian military intervention. In the case of total
separation, the degree of compromise forced on Kazakhstan will be a function of the
perceived strength of the Kazakh armed forces, versus the value of voluntary Kazakh
cooperation. The value of cooperation may be limited. Since Russia is assured, that
in the foreseeable future, Kazakhstan will need Russia as a trading partner, and since
the seceding oblasts would, in any case, provide Russia with benefits. In this case
Kazakhstan's voluntary cooperation might not have much value. As a separate, non-
cooperating nation, Kazakhstan, or Kazakhstan in alliance with others, must be
prepared to resist Russia, by force if necessary.
As a nation in an unfriendly relationship with Russia, Kazakhstan would
also face the difficult task of creating a stable Sino-Kazakh relationship, a task which
would have been made easier by an alliance with Russia.
Sinkiang province, properly the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region,
shares a common border with Kazakhstan. Home of the Chinese nuclear complex
63
and weapons testing center, Sinkiang is also rich in mineral resources, but dryer and
less fertile than Kazakhstan. The population is approximately one third Chinese and
two thirds mixed Kazakh and Uighur. Many of the Kazakhs are setters who fled
Kazakhstan during the collectivization of the 1930's. In the early 1960s, tensions
escalated on the border in response to a general worsening in Sino-Soviet
relationships. Until this time neither side had seen much strategic value in the area,
however troop clashes and Chinese claims to 20,000 square miles of Kazakhstan
escalated the issue. Between 1965 and 1969 Soviet troop strength increased from 18
divisions to 36 divisions on the border in Kazakhstan. (Katz, 1975, p. 222) Tensions
subsided somewhat with the signing of the Sino-Soviet border agreement on May 16,
1989; (Dobbs, 5/17/91, p. A 21) but this agreement did not resolve the claims on the
Sino-Kazakh border. Kazakhstan must be attentive to these claims and troubled by
certain expansionist tendencies of the Chinese state. It should be concerned by the
traditional Chinese desire for stable, subordinate border states, a desire which might
be encouraged by the benefits, both strategic and mineral, the inclusion of
Kazakhstan would bring to the Chinese nation.
Kazakhstan, may also find it difficult to avoid becoming embroiled in
Central Asian conflicts. The struggle for influence between Turkey and Iran in
Central Asia is likely to continue. Combined with ethnic disputes, possible religious
conflicts and competition for resources, water being primary, and Kazakhstan is faced
with a difficult situation along it's southern border.
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There is, of course the possibility of Kazakh entry into an alliance with
either China, some or all of the Central Asian republics, or perhaps some other
outside power. However, few powers with resources sufficient to help Kazakhstan
provide for its security and develop its economy also have significant interests in
Central Asia. All things considered Russia looks more attractive than China, Iran,
Turkey or any of the other local nations.
An alliance with Russia, combined with a reasonable sufficiency in
defensive capabilities appears to be an attractive course of action for Kazakhstan.
It resolves most of the Kazakh security concerns, it secures access to markets and a
transportation infrastructure unavailable elsewhere, and it alleviates ethnic tensions.
If it is acceptable to the Kazakh people, it is probably the best accommodation that
can be made for Kazakh national aspirations.
But an alliance with Russia may be unacceptable for seve'al reasons. It
is conceivable that Russia could turn again to Tsarist and Soviet expansionist policies.
Even as an ally Kazakhstan must fear another wave of Slavic immigration, and it is
doubtful if the environment itself could withstand a return to the exploitation of the
last 100 years. It is also conceivable that, even if Russian policy is acceptable, public
sentiment would not allow a close relationship with Russia. Memories run long in
this part of the world. Past wrongs, combined with resurgent Islam, might make it
impossible for Kazakhstan to act in an alliance with Slavic states.
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B. SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIAN-KAZAKH CONFLICT
As much as rational statesmen on both sides of the border might wish to avoid
it; several scenarios suggest themselves which might lead to confrontation between
Kazakhstan and Russia.
1. Scenario 1: Revenge
The Kazakhs, having suffered so much for so long at Russian hands could
conceivably harbor a thirst for revenge. Vengeance based policies, which lay aside
rational calculations of costs and benefits, are currently in fashion in much of the
world. The Balkans immediately come to mind as a notable and tragic example.
However, when it comes to nuclear weapons and materials it is difficult to see how
any Kazakh administration could believe that any use against Russia could have any
but the most suicidal consequences. If Kazakhstan were to adopt this policy, it would
be necessary to do the Russian nation as much harm as quickly as possible in
anticipation of a counterstrike. Quite probably targets of particular cultural or
emotional value would be chosen. Fortunately, the Kazakh have shown little
inclination towards this non-productive behavior. Perhaps a calculated analysis has
shown that they would gain little satisfaction and much more pain. Unless triggered
by some Russian provocation, this scenario is considered the least probable.
2. Scenario 2: Islamic Fundamentalism
In the wake of independence, Islam has emerged as a stronger force in
Kazakh life than was previo. sly thought to be likely. As an Islamic nation,
Kazakhstan can be expected to be under pressure to export nuclear technology,
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material and perhaps weapons to the Muslim world. As yet Islamic fundamentalists
are not a stiong force in Kazakh politics however their political positions are growing
in popularity. Representatives of the extremist Islamic parties are generally tied to
political platforms which support fellow moslems against the oppression of the
"Godless. In practice this usually means members of the local ethnic group against
slavic immigrants, former communists in power or any other non-moslem in
opposition. This has led the leadership of the 7heltoksan party to call for volunteers
to defend the Azerbaijani Muslims in Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenia. (RFE-RL,
5/11/92) Furthermore, the party leadership has stated that if the government will
not assist the party in this cause, the members will raise their own funds to support
their fellow muslims. Russia is already unofficially involved on the Armenian side.
Recently five Russian soldiers were sentenced to death by the Azerbaijani supreme
court for their part in battles in Nagorno-Karabakh. (DPA, 5/12/93, 1408) The
course of action demanded by Zheltoksan would put Kazakhstan in direct opposition
to Russia, an ally of Armenia (and Kazakhstan) in the CIS. In neighboring
Uzbekistan the president, Islam Karimov, vowed to prevent the establishment of
Islamic fundamentalism. The Uzbek president is concerned that the bloody civil war
in Tajikistan, between the former communists in charge of the government and the
Islamic fundamentalists members of the Islamic Revival Party (RPP), might spread
to Uzbekistan. (Kynge, 3/4/92, 0942) Both Russian and Kazakh troops are involved
with Uzbek forces in assisting the Tajik government. As yet, the extremists seem to
be in a distinct minority. With so many problems of there own it may be difficult for
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the majority of Kazakhs to develop a commitment to Islamic extremist causes.
Certainly, the current government does not reflect these views; however, given time,
the Islamic extremists might combine Kazakh nationalism and Islamic fundamen-
talism to become a potent force in Kazakh politics. A political alliance to the
extremist parties of the Islamic world could result in numerous difficulties not only
for Russia but for the west as well. For instance, there would be enormous pressure
on Kazakhstan (and considerable temptation) to export nuclear technology and
perhaps nuclear material to co-religionists. Nursultan Nazarbayev has already been
repeatedly forced to deny exportation of nuclear weapons to Iran. (FBIS-SOV,
1/28/92, p. 4) and (JPRS-TND, 10/21/92, p. 28) Were violations of non-
proliferation objectives to occur they are likely to occur covertly, perhaps on an
individual to individual basis and perhaps accompanied by significant transfers of
funds.
3. Scenario 3: Russian Intervention
Ethnic relations are potentially the most severe, explosive and intractable
problem facing Kazakhstan. The disparity of wealth and the concentration of Slavs
in the border oblasts, where Kazakhs are in a distinct minority, coupled with the lack
of assimilation by Slavs into Kazakh society, almost ensures that ethnic groups will
be in conflict. Kazakh resentment of Slavic settlers has fueled every revolt since the
Tsarist conquest. Were the Slavs to make every effort, which is unlikely, to integrate
into the Kazakh nation, acceptance might still be tenuous. The clan-family structure
of society combined with memories from the holocaust of collectivization and the
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lingering resentments from the dispossession of Kazakhs by Russian settlers may
prove to be insurmountable obstacles. As Machiavelli advised the Prince: "above
all he must abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget more easily the
death of their father than the loss of their patrimony." (Machiavelli, 1952, p. 90)
This was wise advice, but completely disregarded by the Russian conquerors.
What then will happen to the settlers? It cannot be imagined that 6.2
million Russian settlers will return quietly to Russia. If they are denied acceptance
on equal footing in the Kazakh nation, succession becomes a desirable option.
Groups such as The Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan and
political action committees in the northern oblasts have already become the core of
a separatist movement. (Olcott, 1990, p. 76) The Kazakh media has expressed
considerable concern over this issue and it is practically inconceivable that the
Kazakhs would peacefully endure the loss of their most fertile provinces. Conflict
and violence seem almost inevitable. (FBIS, 7/20/92, p. 93) and (FBIS, 9/4/92, p.
86) It is not difficult to imagine situations in which ethnic Russians, dissatisfied with
their treatment in Kazakhstan, would attempt to secede and join with Russia. Any
active, effective secessionist movement is almost sure to call forth repressive
measures from the Kazakh government. Russia, on the other hand, is likely to prove
ready to protect and advance the rights of ethnic Russians when it perceives an
advantage or moral obligation to do so. The protection of ethnic Russians is an
enduring and popular political stance in Russia and one which crosses party lines.
It is doubtful if any Russian government could abandon 6 million ethnic Russians to
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their fate and remain in power. Thus, two nuclear powers could come into direct
conflict for the first time in history.
70
PART I, AN A'IALYSIS OF POLICY
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VI. INTRODUCTION
In a confrontation with the Russian Federation many options are available to
the Kazakh leadership. In this section we will attempt to develop a methodology for
evaluation of various courses of action, and then test the methodology by applying
it to an evaluation potential Kazakh policies.
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VII. A THEORY FOR EVALUATION OF DETERRENT STRATEGIES
Deterrent strategies are unique in that their objective is the prevention of
conflict rather than victory. As a class they seek to persuade rather than compel.
While strategies in general seek to accomplish specific goals, the objective for a
deterrent strategy is to persuade the opponent not to attempt to realize some
objective. Hence, deterrence only exists in the mind of the opponent. Since a
rational opponent makes decisions based on costs, benefits and their probabilities of
attainment, it is appropriate to consider costs and benefits first.
A. COSTS AND BENEFITS
The calculus of rational deterrence suggests that for deterrence to hold, the
value, or utility, of peaceful actions must be greater than the value of warfare. In the
general case values of costs and benefits may vary over time and are expressed as:
V(t) = B(t) - C1(t) - C2(t)
Where V is the value gained from a course of action and V(t) is a function of time,
and where B(t) is defined as the benefits of a course of action, C,(t) is defined as
one's own cost to pursue that course of action and C2 (t) is the cost or pain caused
by any opposition to that course of action. C,(t) is under the control of the actor and
C2(t) is under control of the opposition.
In" the specific case of nuclear war, violence is concentrated in a short span of
time, and in this case the values above may be assumed to be constant. This would
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not be true for cases of conventional warfare or other cases where warfare would
continue long enough for the values to vary with time.
Consider two sides, A and B and assume that A is the aggressor and B seeks
to deter A. If the perceived benefits and costs of aggression and resistance/defense,
are expressed as:
BA: The benefit to the aggressor from his act.
CAI: Where CAI equals the cost of aggression, as expended by the aggressor.
It includes not only system costs for aggressive systems, but opportunity
costs, costs for active and passive defenses and the cost of systems which
would respond to the defenders counter-strike(s). CAI is the sum of
expenditures by the aggressor.
CMA: represents the pain of aggression as extracted from the aggressor by the
defender.
BB: The benefit to the defender from his resistance.
CB: Where C31 equals the cost of the defense, as spent by the defender. It
includes his active and passive defenses as well as the cost of his
retaliatory systems.
C3 2 : represents the pain of resisting. It is caused to the defender by the
aggressor.
Then a deterrent condition, for a rational actor, can be expressed as:
V(t:) (Jm• 2t V(t:) (Ms)
This can be expressed side A as:
SA(FRA - C..(P 2 DA(XU) - CAV-. - C()
Side A must consider whether the benefits obtained in peace, BA(P.cE), less his own
costs in peace, CAI(PFcE), are greater than benefits obtained by war, BA•WA), his own
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costs in war, CuuwAR), and the pain of war, CuA. Interestingly enough the real,
objective values of these coefficients are not important. It is perceived, or subjective
values, which influence an actor's response. If B seeks to deter A then B must
persuade A that the above inequality holds. If the benefits of peace, BA•.ACE), is not
large enough or if A's own costs (CAa(PMcE)) are too high, then the deterring party
must seek to affect A's perception of the right side of the inequality.
With this thought, rational deterrence may be assumed to have been established
when the inequality of equation 1 is believed to exist along with three other
conditions:
- The deterrent threat must be perceived as executable; or expressed another
way, the threat by the defender to extract cause the pain of Cu must be
perceived as physically executable.
The deterrent threat must be credible. The aggressor must believe that the
defender will cause the pain of CuA, even in light of the pain, C,, he will
suffer for resisting.
- The aggressor must have a contingent strategy; that is to say, there must be
another, more acceptable option for the aggressor than paying the cost
CAIj + Cu for gain BAewA).
The defender has, as his tools to deter aggression, his ability to affect the coefficients
of equation 1. He may follow any number of strategies as shown in the following
examples.
First, the defender might alter the value of BA(wA) by reducing the intrinsic
value of the aggressors goal. A scorched earth policy would be such a strategy if it
were employed only as a strategy of denying benefits to the aggressor. Second, the
defender might increase the cost of aggression which is spent by the aggressor,
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C~uawR), by constructing retaliatory systems which drive up the costs of both
aggressive systems and any active or passive defenses constructed by a potential
aggressor to minimize C., the pain of aggression. The development of the MIRV
as a second strike weapon is an example of this. The defender can also drive up
costs of CuawAy by constructing defenses which increase the cost of offensive
systems. The proposal to field SDI is a somewhat weak example of this. Although
promoted as a system which would decrease the pain Cl which the aggressor could
extract from the defender if he resisted, the major effect of this system would be to
protect second strike systems and thus increase the cost C,, which the defender could
extract from the aggressor. In this the American side saw an increase in deterrent
power. The Soviet side argued that in reality the purpose of these systems was to
protect aggressive systems, thus increasing the Soviet pain of resisting aggression, C82.
Several Soviet scientists also made the argument that it was not worth while for the
United States to deploy SDI, because with a relatively small increase in
countermeasures (a small increase in Soviet CmrcE)) they could drive the U.S.
costs of defense, CuM.cE), beyond the U.S. capacity to pay. (Freedman, 1989, pp.
414-415) and (Yost, 1988, pp. 201-?09)
The aggressor, in constructing active or passive defenses may be thought of as
attempting to reduce the pain, C~A, which the defender can cause, and thus reverse
the inequality of eqn. 1 and make aggression pay. In this manner, as we saw above,
the construction of defenses can be considered as an aggressive act. Of course were
the defender to construct those same defenses he could see himself as trying to
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reduce the pain of resistance, C.W which the aggressor could force him to pay. In a
situation when each regards the other as the aggressor and himself as the defender,
there is no natural stability until the costs begin to approach the limits of fiscal
capacity.
When there is a question of credibility the defender may increase the value of
defending a goal against an aggressor's actions by increasing the value of a specific
goal to the defender. This has the effect of increasing the value of B3kwAR and
increasing the defenders incentive to fight for the goal. This might be done by
increasing the subjective value of the goal with a public commitment to its defense;
such as is seen in the policy of "extended deterrence," or it may be done by increasing
the intrinsic value of the goal itself. For instance, the establishment of settlements
in disputed territory would increase the intrinsic value of the territory to the defender
(both physical and psychological) and hence make it more likely thdt it would be
defended. This brings out the point that there are two components to the coefficient,
B. There is a component which expresses the objective, physical value of the goal,
and also a component which expresses the subjective, psychological value.
Even when there is not a question of executability or credibility there is a
probabilistic nature to the likelihood of benefits and costs. A defender may have
every intent in extracting cost C~A from an aggressor, but his systems may not
function. On the other hand a defender may have excellent systems, but his will may
be weak. The concept of Irrationality Based Deterrence as developed by Edward
Rhodes (Rhodes, 1989) relies on this probabilistic nature. It proposes the creation
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of systems to extend deterrence to objectives which have a value (Bt..)) too low to
rationally warrant a nuclear response, by creating systems in which the defender has
some probability of extracting the cost CjA from the aggressor, even though if he does
so, the cost CN, extracted by the aggressor from the defender may be cataclysmically
high and approach infinity.
B. EXPECTED UTILITY OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS
The probabilistic nature of costs and benefits makes it necessary incorporate
probability into our analysis in order to evaluate the expected utility of various
strategies.
The expected utility of an outcome is defined as the sum of the values of
individual events multiplied by the probabilities of their occurrence. If there are
several events, event 1, event 2 etc. then the equation takes this form.
Z ( V) = V3*p2 + V2 *Pa .... 3)
Here;
E(U) = expected utility of a course of action.
v = value, positive, or negative of a event
p = probability of occurrence8
The expected utility of a strategy is the sum of the expected utility of all events which
comprise the strategy.
'As with 'v(t) probabilities may vary with time; however, in the case of nuclear war the same
assumptions hold and here probability is assumed to be invariant with time.
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Jr (Uj)(4)
la cfnsidering political/military strategies, in event is defined by the status of
two sub-events; the achievement of the goals chosen and the occurrence of war. In
this analysis we will consider the value of the goal which is achieved to be the net
value of the benefits of a particular strategy, i.e., V = B. C1- C2. The cost or pain
of warfare, a negative value is defined C2. The pain of warfare, C2, is the pain or
cost inflicted by the enemy. In confrontations between the Soviet Union and the
United States, when C2 was assumed to be an all-out nuclear war, the value of C2
was assumed to approach infinity, a catastrophe. But; even in this case, goals were
not limited to the avoidance of catastrophe but included other elements. Goals may
be met or not met. Likewise a warfare may or may not occur. These events are
represented as:
g = goals met:
S= goals axn'e met:
V = wazxfaz. oc•cr
v = waxfaze doesn't: occur
The two states of the two sub-events combine to give four possible joint events:
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gA n a oal a are met; no war occurs.
nA w - Goala are mist; war occurs.
n~ v - Nro goalsao nomt but no war occurs.
gOw = No goal, are mt; war occurs,.
In the case where war is assumed to equal catastrophe it could be argued that
the probability of achieving the goal is the inverse of the probability of a catastrophe
and that from this the sub-events are mutually exclusive.
,P4 s = 1-.PV
This may be disproved by counter-example. Consider the case of an actor motivated
by vengeance, whose only goal is the destruction of another actor. In this case the
goal is included in the catastrophe and the catastrophe and goal are not mutually
exclusive. This is an important point. The goals of real-world strategies cannot be
defined solely in terms of deterrence (avoidance of catastrophe). If this were so the
simplest and most effective deterrent strategy would be complete and immediate
surrender.
The four joint events each have a value and a probability of occurrence. Their
sum is the expected utility of a strategy.
Z(O) = V(vwn P(1 flo + V(r ) P(r*lq
* V(Y ) P(qflI (3)
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1. Case 1, Dependent Events
It is necessary to consider the sub-events of gain and warfare as both
statistically dependent and independent events. If events are dependent the
occurrence of one affects the probability of the other. In this case:
P(V fl11  O n P w
and the conditional probability of g given w is:
Using the definition of conditional probability eqn. 3 becomes:
J(o) = Vvn (.P,,-) + Vn v (A••P-.,) + y,, (nP,.,,P.) (4)
+ V1n., (PjjvP.)
Since:
Z(I* = Vgn;; Pgtw + V~n;; Pg-1 + •'.[ Von,, Part + Vi~n, e, Iv (s)
-Vg n1 P ,i - Vwn As, ]
Ignoring for a moment the question of who is the aggressor and who is the defender
the values of the four joint events defined above are:
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Vo,nw =Bu) zý) - a 981zl wi Lbue az
Vi nw ~Ci (o) - i Ca, 00gaim " war
Vi n ; 3- C3,nism ne01t-,he gain J20Z wax
Note that B(WA) does not equal B(MECE) nor does C1 (wAR equal C, (PFcE).
Substituting these in eqn. 5 leads to:
+ -P1 I B( zjMW, IVW C-1(MAR) PV I - 42PO I - Cl MW )0 F1i
- C2P4 - 3 iac UIA ff I + C3. (PAM P9 uI + C3 PA ~'ii; 11
since:
B~v&F, 1vj; -B3(~c) P9,I;;w (paoce)Pui; w-=B(PZAcw)P(UflU,
and
vW C1(PEAM - C1 PZAM I "A "
eqn. 6 becomes.
S(O) = B(P, mP(gn; + B(=x1 )P(gnfl,- C,(Pz)PP-wP(CX(1g5) + C 2 ) (7)
BQ'L4cE",nP~n) - CiP~j~,'-Bwm~n, - PW(Cli(WDJ + C 2)
Deterrence is established when;
and from the definition of conditional probability this may be expressed as:
82
- (BW ),POI rl- clips&=)> P, (B(VWJPhI, - C( -C) (8)
2. Case il, Independent Case
If gain and war are statistically independent then the knowledge that one
event has occurred gives no information about the probability of the second ev' zt.
The conditional probability of g given w is the unconditional probability of g. Events
are independent if:
and if they are independent the conditional probability of g given w is equal to:
P(g1 , -F• g,
Now considering the case of statistical independence and using this assumption
and the identity:
-= 1 - P,
and after some expansion and combination of terms eqn. 3 may be expressed as:
+(O) P=(V(oni-V(wnz) + Pw(V(jn÷)-V(ing) (9)
Substituting the values for the joint events as above in eqn. 9 yields eqn. 10 for the
case where BeWAre does not equal B(PEACE) and C1 (wAR does not equal C1 (PEACE)9
if( 7) = Pgf(B (Pgacz) + P. ICC 1(Mam C1 (MMp) - C2 ]3 (10)
+ • , P,, (B(m) - BPt . - cPB -,
9 Complete proofs for the dependent and independent cases are contained in Appendix 1.
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C. EVALUATION OF DETERRENT STRATEGIES
Equations 7 and 10 may now be used to evaluate deterrent strategies in the
dependent and independent cases. The dependent case will generally prove to be
more useful for the concrete problems at hand. In the case of two rational actors P.
and P,, are not independent; that is to say, in the real world the probability of
achieving a goal is somehow related to the probability of war. We also find that the
benefits of peace are different in kind and quantity from the benefits of war and in
addition the self-expenditure C1 is different in war than in peace; hence, C, ,,,) is not
equal to C1 (,..) and B(,.,) is not equal to B•.,,,.
Therefore it is appropriate to use equation 7 and the inequality of equation 8.
E([ = B(PAczP(n.-.) + BmAmP~sn. - C(PFAcgP - P.,(Ci(waz + C 2 ) (7)
P; (B,.oPs I; - CI(pjgc) > P. (BwAMPs I. - Cj(wAM - C2 ) (8)
Evaluation of the inequality of equation 8 may be either quantitative or
qualitative. Quantitative techniques exist which might be used to estimate the values
of the coefficients in eqn. 8; however, the current state of the art is unable to resolve
large uncertainty errors and some inherent inaccuracies. The confident employment
of quantitative techniques awaits further developments in the art.
Qualitative techniques, while in a sense less satisfying, yield useful results in
most cases. Diverse fields such as Sociology, Psychiatry and Jurisprudence generally
find the use of qualitative estimation techniques satisfactory. The concept of
the "reasonable man" is used in Jurisprudence where it is presumed that we may
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understand the actions of the plaintiff or defendant if we posit that he acts as a
reasonable man would act in his circumstances. Adapting the theory of "the
reasonable man" to evaluate eqn. 8 suggests that it is possible to understand the
relative, subjective value another actor would place on the coefficients of eqn. 8 if
we understand; first, the value structure of this actor, and second, the combined
motivations and societal/cultural constraints on his actions.
This implies, that in evaluating Kazakhstan's strategic options, we will be
accurate and correct only insofar as we understand the Kazakhs themselves; their
culture, their society, their value structures and their history.
As is our estimation of the values of the coefficients, it is of equal importance
that we understand how to vary those factors. If side B is to establish or maintain
deterrence by manipulating the inequality of eqn. 8 then we must understand how
this is to be accomplished. In the final analysis actor B seeks to change actors A's
subjective valuation of the coefficients of the deterrent inequality, eqn.8. He may do
this in a purely subjective manner through policy initiatives, psychological warfare,
misdirection or some other non-material technique. B may also seek to change A's
valuation through objective, material means; but of course these will have no effect
unless A is aware of them and can alter his subjective valuations based on new
objective factors. The movie "Dr. Strangelove" demonstrates this point when the
"Doomsday Machine" constructed by the Soviet Union had no deterrent effect on the
United States, which was unaware of it.
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If side B desires to establish or strengthen deterrence he must increase the
value of peace, the left side of eqn. 8, or decrease the value of war on the right side
of the equation. Let us examine some of B's potential courses of action with regard
to the various coefficients.
P The probability of peace
B may decrease the probability of war by allying himself with A, or by
establishing informal friendly ties. B may attempt to develop friendly relationships
between the populace or between members of the ruling classes.
J Benefits of peace
B may increase the material benefits of peace to A by establishing profitable
trading relationships. In earlier times B might have paid tribute, a physical benefit.
B must take care when developing his material wealth as this may also increase the
benefits of war, BMW There is a danger in becoming too rich. B might also
increase the benefits of peace to A by establishing a supportive alliance which would
decrease the self induced costs, C,, A may be forced to pay with respect to another
actor C. B may increase the subjective benefits of peace to A by propaganda,
cultural exchange programs or other psychological efforts.
Pl; The probability that A will obtain his goal, given that there is peace
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The increased benefits of peace are of little value to A, if A has little chance
of realizing these benefits. B may not find it necessary to increase BmuCE) if he can
increase the probability that A will receive some lower level of values. In order to
do this, B may establish formal trading relationships, commercial treaties or a "Most
Favored Nation" status. In former times the probability of tribute actually being paid
was increased by the exchange of hostages. A more modem example is seen in the
occupation of the Rhineland by Allied powers after World War I. In part this was
done to ensure that war reparations would be paid on time and in full.
q ( m€ Self Induced Costs in Peace
B may make peace more attractive by reducing A's self induced costs through
arms control negotiations, or by refraining from acquiring offensive systems.
P, Probability of War
Side B may attempt to reduce the probability of war; however this is difficult
to do independently of other factors. P. depends of the evaluation of other factors
by side A, the potential aggressor and on the will of side B. Side B can increase the
probability of war, in this case the probability that B will fight by the construction of
automatic response systems or systems with fragile command ard control. Rhodes
proposes this in his theory of irrationality-based deterrence (Rhodes, 1989).
B(.) Benefits of war
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B may reduce the benefits of war by ensuring that A will receive no material
benefits from aggression. In the recent Gulf War had the government of Kuwait
been able to establish a credible threat to destroy their oil fields it might have gone
far towards removing the incentives for aggression. Obviously it is difficult to
establish credibility for this policy of denial, and in addition one is faced with the
difficulty that the aggression may not be motivated solely by material motives.
Denial of material gain may not be enough to deter aggression. Kuwait might have
been able to deter aggression by establishing alliances with another actor, side C.
By increasing the value of Kuwait at peace, (B(PrcE)) to side C, Kuwait would put
the new side (C + B) in a deterring relationship to side A. The fact that Kuwait was
able to do this even after having failed to deter war says much about the value of
peace, B(,_.ACE) to the other players.
P, I, Probability of Success Given War
The probability that A will achieve his goals given that there is war. This may
not be victory in the conventional sense. This is the probability that A will attain the
benefits of war, objective or subjective. B can affect this value directly by
expenditures CI(pAcE).
q (.,) Self-induced Costs of War
B may increase the costs of CIwAR) to A by several means. For instance, B may
construct extensive defensive systems or B may use propaganda, psychological
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warfare or political means to raise the political price A must pay for war. Referring
back to Pw, B may increase the probability that will have to pay CjvWAR) by increasing
the probability that B will resist aggression. This reduces the chance that if side A
chooses war and side B would choose peace (surrender without a fight). A's payoff
in this case would be B(WAR)" COIWAR), and CjlwAR) would be lower than Cj~wA1 ).
SPain of War, the costs of war caused by the opposition
B may enhance deterrence by increasing C2, beyond A's desire to pay. If the
pain of war is extreme the probability of war, i.e., the probability that B will fight,
need not be high. Conversely, if C2 is low P, must be high and if C. is too low the
certainty that B will fight, might not be sufficient to deter war.
D. EXPECTED PAYOFF MATRIX FOR KAZAKHSTAN VERSUS RUSSIA
In analysis of policy options for Kazakhstan, it will be useful to construct a
matrix of the expected payoffs in the case of Kazakhstan versus Russia. In the matrix
of Figure 1 the columns represent Kazakh expected payoffs for the choices of war or
peace. Similarly the rows represent the Russian expected payoffs. These payoffs are
calculated from eqn. 7 for the expected utility of strategic options in the dependent
case. The extreme (highest and lowest) values of eqn. 7 are calculated in order to
bound the problem. In order to do this we assume that when one player or the other
chooses peace, P, equals 0. Likewise when a player chooses war, P, equals 1. A
rational player will attempt to make the selection which will yield him the highest
payoff, and will also attempt to persuade the other player to make choices which will
89
allow him this payoff. Unlike classic game theory, in which the only choice to be
made involves which strategy or mixture of strategies which is to be played in order
to optimize your own return; here the players are allowed to attempt to optimize
their payoff by affecting the payoffs of the opponent."0
From Figure 1 it can be seen that the optimal policy for Kazakhstan is to drive
Russia to choose peace. This is not necessarily the highest Russian payoff. Under
our assumptions that payoff is probably when Russia chooses war and Kazakhstan
chooses peace (surrender); therefore Kazakhstan must persuade Russia that this
option will not be chosen by Kazakhstan. It is still possible that peace will not offer
the highest payoff to the Russians. Material rewards combined with political
rewards, may make the benefits of war higher for Russia than the benefits of peace.
This could occur in the case of ethnic turmoil in Kazakhstan which creates internal
political pressures in Russia. To avoid this situation Kazakhstan must ensure that the
benefits of peace to Russia are higher than the benefits of war. All Kazakh policy
must be directed to this end.
"1Because we are now dealing with both Russia and Kazakhstan it is necessary to introduce a
refinement to our notation and append an "r" or V as is appropriate.
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This concludes the preliminary development of a method for the evaluation of
deterrent options. This section developed a statement for the expected utility of
deterrent options, and then used this statement to express an inequality which
describes the condition of deterrence. Future work in this area should include an
analysis of the effects of values which vary over time as well as the treatment of the
probabilities as stochastic processes, a family of random variables which vary over
time. It may also be useful to develop refinements in the techniques for quantitative
estimation of the coefficients of these equations. The matrix of expected payoffs in
Figure 1 and the inequality of equation 8 can now be used in the analysis of
deterrent options open to Kazakhstan.
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VIII. POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION FOR KAZAKHSTAN
A. INTRODUCTION
The Chinese character for crisis combines the characters for danger and
opportunity. It aptly describes Kazakhstan today. In the analysis of Part I we have
gained some appreciation of the problems facing the new Republic of Kazakhstan.
Having barely survived two and one half centuries of Russian rule the Kazakh
have suddenly found themselves masters of an new nation. They possess consider-
able agricultural and mineral resources and have the opportunity to mature into a
wealthy and influential state. Unfortunately, along with independence the
Kazakhstan inherited an impressive list of problems. Kazakhstan fell heir to some
of the worst environmental problems in the world: areas contaminated by radiation,
areas contaminated with chemicals and pesticides, and soils on the verge of
destruction by poor farming practices. Kazakhstan has also acquired serious ethnic
problems, caused by centuries of colonization, and potentially serious social problems
caused by resurgent Islamic traditionalism. Regardless of the seriousness of these
problems, one problem remains paramount, as it has throughout Kazakh history:
Kazakhstan's relationship with Russia. Three potential scenarios for Kazakh-Russian
conflict were discussed in Part I; a Kazakhstan attack on Russia from motives of
revenge, an Islamic Fundamentalist government in Kazakhstan and ethnic conflict in
Kazakhstan which causes Russian intervention. These were listed in order of
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increasing likelihood. It is entirely unlikely that a Kazakh desire for revenge would
lead them into a suicidal attack on Russia. It is only slightly less unlikely that the
rise of an Islamic Fundamentalist government in Kazakhstan could lead to hostile
relations with Russia. However, it is entirely possible that already strained ethnic
relations between ethnic Kazakhs and Slavic settlers could boil over into the sort of
open warfare which would impel Russian intervention. The leaders of Kazakhstan
will have to be exceptionally cautious and wise in order to maintain Kazakhstan's
independence and a cordial relationship with Russia. In order to accomplish this
what sort of options are available to the Kazakhstan government?
B. INEFFECTIVE OPTIONS
Not all the options suggested by eqn. 8 are available or would be effective for
Kazakhstan. First, Kazakhstan will have difficulty in affecting the Russian
expenditure, Cr1 (Pl•CE), self-induced costs. Russia has many security concerns more
pressing than Kazakhstan. These concerns are of such a magnitude that Russian
expenditures are already quite high and it is unlikely that Kazakh actions could drive
it much higher. Second, the size and efficiency of the Russian armed forces, in
comparison to any reasonable forces Kazakhstan might develop, make it unlikely that
Kazakhstan could increase the Russian costs of war, Cr,•wA). In other words,
potential Russian expenditures during a war might be lowered from their current
levels by Kazakh actions, but it is unlikely that they could be raised appreciably.
Third, as discussed in Part I, Kazakhstan has a difficult task ahead of it in the
creation of effective armed forces. This implies that in the near future, Kazakhstan
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by itself will be unable to affect the conditional probability of a Russian victory given
war, P,, .,. Given the above assumptions, at least with respect to Russia, Kazakh
military expenditures need not be large.
C. CORDIAL RELATIONS
Since Kazakhstan can have little effect on Crl1 JCA) ,Criu(w or P(uIwr
inspection of the payoff matrix and eqn. 8 suggests that Kazakhstan might success-
fully deter Russian aggression by establishing cordial relations and increasing
6rouwc) , the benefits of peace and P(5 1-,, the probability of receiving the
benefits of peace. In order to increase F,, Kazakhstan might promote commerce
through formal treaties, selective tariffs and favorable legislation. Cultural
exchange programs might also be of some use; however, inter-ethnic hostility withi;-
Kazakhstan, combined with the general low regard of many Russians for Central
Asians, will present difficulties on the inter-personal level. Never-the-less formal
relationships between governments can still increase P(,1 -,.
The benefits of peace which Kazakhstan can offer are substantial and range
from the production of grain and other foodstuff, to access to considerable mineral
wealth and a key strategic position buffering Russia from the poorer, more radical
Islamic states to the south. Unfortunately as Kazakhstan increases the material value
of BropEcz.it is also increasing the material advantages which would be available
to Russia after a victorious war. Since the probability of Russia achieving its goals
in a war with Kazakhstan, P(, I.), is high, then the material benefits of peace are
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almost equal to those of war-unless Kazakhstan can find a %vay to reduce the
benefits of war.
Kazakhstan could adopt a policy of denial and develop plans to destroy the
mines and the oil fields, and to contaminate the Virgin Lands. However, as was
discussed above it is difficult to establish credibility for such a policy and there are
additional reasons to doubt that it is executable. It is not clear how to go about
destroying oil reserves, nor is it clear that the slavic population of the Virgin Lands
would stand by while the land was poisoned. With respect toBrt cBKazakhstan
is on the horns of a dilemma. An increase in the material benefits of peace may also
increase the benefits of war. Since Kazakhstan is unable to affect the probability of
Russian success given war, P(1 I.),it must concentrate on increasing the Russian
probability of receiving the benefits of peace, P(• -,"
D. ALLIANCES
Kazakhstan must consider and allow for the eventuality that Russia may find
the probability of benefits form peace too low or the benefits of war too high to
resist war with Kazakhstan. In this case having been unable to affect Cr1 mucpj)
CrI(w.4o or P(,lI), and having failed in attempts to increase Br(pmcz) , the
benefits of peace and P,,,;,,, the probability of receiving those benefits to accept-
able levels, Kazakhstan is left with few options. One option remains before
Kazakhslan must attempt to effect dqterrence by increasing , the amin of war
By entenng into an alirance with a third party kazakhstan can increase "he value of
peace to the third party. In this case the payoff matrix must be recalculated for the
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case of Russia versus Kazakhstan + Ally, and the new side may be able to affect the
self induced costs of war or peace or the probability of a Russian victory.
Without time to develop conventional strength, Kazakhstan could seek support
in a system of alliances. Major regional powers that may have an interest in
Kazakhstan are Turkey, Iran, China and India.
India offers a well trained and well equipped army, nuclear capability and a
military industrial complex. On the negative side India has difficult relations with
numerous Islamic countries. This may make an alliance difficult from the aspect of
Kazakh internal politics. India also considers Russia a major trading partner, and
before the collapse of the Soviet Union received 15% of its military goods from
Russia. Russia and India also havc a common interest in restraining China. Were
Kazakhstan to find itself in opposition to Russia it might not find India a reliable
ally.
A Kazakh-Turkish or Kazakh-Iranian alliance might provide firm and reliable
support; however, neither can provide much in the way of conventional forces
capable of defeating the Russians.
China, assuming it is not itself reduced to impotence by internal dissension, has
much to offer as an ally. China brings to the table a large, somewhat well trained,
and fairly well equipped army, the possibility of counter pressure at other areas along
the Sino-Russian border, and a nuclear capability. Unfortunately, China may also
have territorial ambitions. There is no evidence that life under Chinese suzerainty
would be any better than the former life as a member of the USSR.
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Existing in the midst of a multi-polar power struggle, Kazakhstan has the
potential to broker influence in a "balance of power" scenario. However, it is
doubtful if this would be successful for very long, especially if treatment of ethnic
Russians were to inhibit Kazakhstan's ability to claim Russia as an ally against China.
A likely outcome of Kazakhstan's attempt to balance Russia, India and China in
competition, would be Russia and India in opposition to Kazakhstan and China.
While Russia might accept a neutral Kazakhstan (if not impelled to intervene by
other reasons) it would certainly be compelled to intervene by the prospect of a
Chinese Kazakhstan. An attempt to form a close alliance with China could be
hazardous for Kazakhstan.
E. SECURITY GUARANTIES AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE
If Kazakhstan becomes a non-nuclear nation and finds itself in opposition to
Russia, the question of "extended deterrence" may arise. China as well as India, and
perhaps Pakistan in the future, have the capability of attempting to extend nuclear
deterrence to Kazakhstan. The policy of "Extended Deterrence," as applied by the
United States to Europe, considers an attack on Europe as an attack on the United
States. This is declared credible on the basis that Europe represents a vital interest
to the United States. Despite the undisputed importance of Europe to the United
States, the credibility of this policy was not easy to establish with the Russians or
even with the Europeans.
lizakhstan does not represent a vital interest to any other state, except perhaps
Russia. Extended deterrence such as Western Europe has enjoyed is thus denied to
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Kazakhstan. No nuclear power could credibly threaten to attack Russia for
aggression in Kazakhstan, knowing that it might receive total devastation in return.
On the other hand, it is not impossible that an outside power could offer a credible
commitment to fight a nuclear war confined to Kazakhstan. In such a case it seems
unlikely that Russia, fearing a retaliation on its own soil, would choose to extend the
war beyond Kazakh borders. Of course this is small comfort to Nazarbayev. This
is an especially unattractive option considering that the hypothetical Kazakh allies
would be conducting counter-force operations against Russian units while both
counter-force and counter-value targets would be available to the Russians.
Examination of the various nations in Central Asia suggest that a useful alliance
structure is unavailable to Kazakhstan. The question then arises as to the viability
of any form of deterrence for Kazakhstan.
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IX. KAZAKH OPTIONS FOR DETERRENCE
Having exhausted the other possibilities, deterrence for Kazakhstan means
increasing the expected pain of war in order to reverse the inequality of eqn. 8 and
make peace more desirable than war. In order to do this kazakhstan must not only
increase Cr 2 the Russian pain of war, but must also increase P,,, the probability of
war, in this case the probability that Kazakhstan will fight, extracting the cost Cr2,
inflicting the pain of war.
A. DETERRENCE WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
If Kazakhstan embarks on courses of action likely to provoke Russian
intervention or if Russia seems intent on reabsorption, then Kazakhstan must be
prepared to resist by force of arms.
Even if the most modem equipment were available, technicians to maintain it
and soldiers to operate it are not. As a conservative estimate, given several years to
acquire modem equipment, five years to train acceptable noncommissioned officers,
another five years to develop a capable officer corps, and Kazakhstan is faced with
at least ten years, before it can field any army capable of meeting the Russians on
an open battlefield, and in Kazakhstan, all the battlefields are open. Lacking the
prescience to provide itself with Afghan mountains or Vietnamese jungles,
Kazakhstan finds the option of guerrilla war severely limited and must seek to
provide itself with other alternatives.
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B. DETERRENCE WITH NUCLEAR FORCES
Kazakhstan cannot hope to defeat Russian intervention with force. It possesses
no conventional military capable of overcoming Russian forces and no allies willing
provide such forces or extend nuclear or conventional deterrence. There is no clear
U.S. policy regarding this situation. Any Kazakh strategic use of nuclear weapons on
Russian soil would be suicidal and the use of tactical nuclear weapons against
Russians on Kazakh soil seems counterproductive-and might invoke a Russian
strategic nuclear response.
If Kazakhstan deems Russian intervention likely, and chooses to resist, it must
develop a deterrent strategy based on internal resources. This strategy must be
capable of deterring both nuclear and conventional forces and must be executable
by Kazakhstan. For a deterrent strategy to work, the deterrent must be feasible,
credible and effective. Given that Kazakhstan cannot construct a conventional force
capable of deterring Russian conventional forces, then Kazakhstan must rely on
nuclear weapons to deter both nuclear and conventional forces.
1. High Technology Deterent Forces
A modern, missile based nuclear strike capability is the most credible and
effective deterrent Kazakhstan could acquire. Such a credible and effective a "hi-
tech" force exists in Kazakhstan today. It consists of the nearly 1,800 nuclear
warheads of the SS-18 ICBM force and would certainly be capable of extracting a
very high value for Cr 2 from Russia. Currently this force is unavailable to
Kazakhstan. Even were the Kazakhs to seize control of these missiles, perhaps with
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the assistance of Russian turncoats, it is difficult to see how Kazakhstan could
acquire the technical knowledge necessary to bypass security interlock systems,
reprogram target parameters, and then operate and maintain these complex systems
for any length of time. In fact, any attempt to take control of these systems is likely
to be dangerous in the extreme. This does not appear to be a feasible deterrent
force for Kazakhstan.
2. Low Technology Deterrent Forces
It might be possible for Kazakhstan to acquire control of some limited
number of warheads and develop a "low-tech" delivery system and deterrent force.
While feasible to develop, the low-tech system, because of its limited numbers and
the relatively long warning-to-launch times would be vulnerable to a pre-emptive
strike. This limits its utility. With limited weapons, poor delivery systems, and facing
stiff defenses, Kazakhstan will have difficulty convincing Russia that any Low-Tech
system it develops could be effective.
3. The Doomsday Weapon
Given that Kazakhstan cannot develop conventional forces sufficient to
deter the Russians, cannot acquire a hi-tech nuclear deterrent force and that low-tech
forces are ineffective, there si..ns to be only one active deterrent option open to
Kazakhstan, the creation of a regional terror weapon--a local doomsday machine.
If such a weapon existed, it might deter Russian aggression; that is, if the Russians
were convinced that it was feasible to build, effective in its employment, and that the
Kazakhs could be expected to use it.
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It is entirely feasible to configure a nuclear weapon to enhance production
of long- term radio-nuclides and then target areas at altitudes which maximize the
effects of fallout. There is little doubt that this would be effective as an area
weapon. A weapon could be designed which would poison entire rivers and deny
large areas to human habitation for centuries if not millennia.
The consequences to Kazakhstan would be severe. Ck2 would approach
infinity. The victim could be expected to respond with instant and massive
retaliation. The world would condemn the perpetrators and demand punishment of
the survivors. This being the case it would be difficult for Kazakhstan to establish
a credible belief that use of this weapon is probable or even possible. Without
credibility there is no deterrence, in our parlance P. k the probability that Kazakhstan
would fight is too low.
4. Establishing Credibility for a Doomsday Weapon
There are only two cases in which Kazakh threats could be believed. The
first is a circumstance in which Kazakhstan can be seen as having nothing more to
loose. If the Kazakh were defeated and on the verge of annihilation, the use of this
weapon becomes very credible. It would be a wise policy for any aggressor would
take care to ensure that the Kazakhs never reached this position. A terror weapon
might preserve Kazakhstan from total annihilation. Paradoxically, this weapon is of
use only to deter total destruction. Even in the case of unlimited conventional
aggression, the Kazakh government could not establish that they might creditably use
this weapon unless they had reason to fear the total destruction of the Kazakh people
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at the hands of conventional forces. Of course, given the history of their treatment
at the hands of the Russians, this fear might not be as hard establish as one would
suppose. It would be difficult if not impossible to establish a credible threat to
rationally use this weapon in the face of an aggression of announced limited
objectives--such as "protecting oppressed fellow Slavs."
In the second case, if there is a possibility that aggression might trigger
irrational actions by Kazakhstan, then the threat is very credible and deterrence may
be established. Two scenarios appear possible. In the first scenario, Russian
provocations might cause the Kazakhs to transition to a strategy of revenge and,
abandoning rational calculations of cost and benefit, concentrate on causing as much
pain as possible to their tormentors. In the second scenario, the Kazakh could simply
loose control of their deterrent forces.
In consideration of the first scenario, a rational aggressor will do all in his
power to avoid triggering a "vendetta response" from nuclear power. The defending
nation also should go to great lengths to avoid leading the opponent to believe that
they are preparing to engage in a strategy of revenge. Revenge, being a non-rational
motive, is not amenable to rational deterrence. When an actor has reason to believe
that an opposing actor is motivated by revenge, he can assume that deterrence has
failed and that he should now concentrate on pre-emptive attack. Both actors should
take all steps to avoid a situation where one side is motivated by a desire for
revenge.
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In the second instance Kazakhstan may be able to establish credibility and
hence deterrence by constructing a deterrent force in which rationally could fail
during war. This increases P. r If this deterrent force is reasonably secure from pre-
emption, then aggression is deterred. Of course, Kazakhstan must convince opposing
actors that rationality and control will hold uWil the force is under attack. Otherwise
there is strong motive for a preemptive attack.
In summary, Kazakhstan has limited options available to preserve its
independence. It may attempt to increase its value to Russia in peace. It may
attempt to establish alliances which would increase Russia's reluctance to interfere
in Kazakhstan, and it may develop weapons which would cause the Russians to avoid
any possibility of their use.
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X. GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
It is in the interest of the United States to deter the use of nuclear weapons
and the export of nuclear material or technology for military purposes. With respect
to Kazakhstan, this is the first and most important goal of American foreign policy.
(Reuters Wire, 5/23/92 1905) Ideally the United States would prefer a Kazakhstan
completely free of nuclear weapons, materials and technology, but the achievement
of these goals is hindered by Kazakh national interests-which are supported by the
retention of a "nuclear insurance policy." If Kazakhstan is to eliminate its nuclear
capability, then these national interests must be satisfied in some other manner other
than by a nuclear capability.
There are apparently three primary goals in Kazakh foreign policy. First, it
seeks to ensure the flow of aid and investment necessary to fuel Kazakh economic
growth. Second, the government of Kazakhstan desires a respected position in the
world community, and most importantly, Kazakhstan seeks to prevent the develop-
ment of forces or circumstances which would threaten Kazakh national integrity. All
other factors being equal, the possession of a nuclear capability serves all three of
these goals. As a nuclear power, Kazakhstan may be perceived as more capable of
guaranteeing its security. A secure Kazakhstan is more attractive to outside
investment dollars. A secure Kazakhstan with a healthy, growing economy would be
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assured of respect and a place in the "new world order," and Kazakhstan with a
doomsday weapon would not fear a Russian version of "ethnic cleansing."
In order to persuade Kazakhstan to relinquish its nuclear capabilities, the
United States will have to convince Kazakhstan that its national interests could be
better served by embracing a non-nuclear status. Current U.S.policy in this regard
centers around economic incentives. In the "Joint U.S.-Kazakhstan Declaration" of
25 May, 1992, (US Dept. of State Dispatch, 5/25/92, p. 402(5)) both nations
"resolved to develop friendly, cooperative relations," and announced their support for
"early ratification and implementation of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty)." It was announced that:
Kazakhstan shall at the earliest possible time, accede to the treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state while preserving the
right of control over the non-use and reductions of the nuclear weapons
temporarily deployed on its territory. Kazakhstan guarantees to carry out the
elimination of all types of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms,
within the 7-year period provided for in the START Treaty.
In return the United States agreed to support various technical assistance programs
and to assist Kazakhstan in the development of a market economy. The U.S. will
conclude:
- A trade agreement that will confer most-favored-nation tariff treatment on
Kazakhstan.
- An OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) agreement that will
make available investment insurance for American firms operating in
Kazakhstan.
- A bilateral investment treaty.
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The United States is attempting to increase the benefits of peace to Kazakhstan
in order to persuade Kazakhstan to relinquish nuclear weapons, which would increase
the pain of war to the Russians and indirectly to the United States. The force of
these economic arguments is such that the U.S. will probably prevail, at least with
respect to Kazakhstan's public policy. However, it is not clear how increasing
BkrWAcE) for Kazakhstan with regard to the United States will address Kazakhstan's
security concerns vis-a-vis the Russians. Kazakhstan's request for security guaranties
from the U.S. has been denied (Washington Post, 5/9/92, p. A 16)1 and Russian
pledges to assist ethnic Russians in need (NYTI, 8/27/91, p.A 7) cannot increase
Kazakhstan's confidence in the future--regardless of present cordial relations with
Russia. While the persuasive American economic arguments may have their desired
effects on the public policy of Kazakhstan; the hard calculus of deterrence may
influence the Kazakhs to retain an "ace-in-the-hole," the Doomsday Machine. T=
are concrete steps the United States might pursue in order to alter this calculus.
First, the U.S. can reduce Brw•). In order to do this the U.S. must address
the subjective, political factors which might compel Russian intervention. The most
urgent and important of these is the resolution of ethnic conflict. Unfortunately this
is not an area in which the U.S., or the rest of the world has had much success.
"In response to a Kazakh request for "special security guarantees" State Department spokesman,
Margaret.Tutwiler responded that the United States "had not considered any new security assurances
to Kazakhstan." (Washington Post, 1992, p. A 16) Ms. Tutwiler went on to say, however, that the United
States stood by its 1968 commitment to seek immediate (but unspecified) action by the U.N. Security
Council in case of aggression or threats against non-nuclear singers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). This vague assurance may have left Kazakhstan somewhat insecure.
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Rather than attempting to resolve these rather intractable issues, it may be more
effective to separate the parties in conflict. In order to do this the U.S. might:
Contribute to the international (CIS) "Russionik" migration fund, which is
being used to assist Kazakhstan Russians migrating from Russia. (FBIS-tJSR,
4/24/93, p. 83)
Encourage an exchange of territory; or perhaps help finance Russian
acquisition of some of the territory primarily occupied by ethnic Russians.
In order to increase the intangible benefits of peace to the ethnic Kazakhs, the
U.S. might:
- Support economic specifically aimed at improving the economic status of the
ethnic Kazakhs.
- Encourage joint Kazakhstan-Russian projects which would raise the value of
peace to both sides.
In order to reduce the values on the right side of eqn. 8 and promote the
Russian probability of choosing peace, (thus decreasing Prw) the U.S. might reduce
Kazakhstan's reliance on nuclear deterrence by increasing their conventional,
defensive capabilities to resist aggression, thus increasing CruwA). Military
assistance programs and loans for Hi-Tech equipment might assist in the
transformation of the Kazakhstan armed forces into effective fighting units. On the
diplomatic front the United States can:
- Support development of regional multiparty security arrangements with a
view towards increasing the collective security of the Central Asian nations.
- Support the development of regional cooperative organizations which work for
the benefit of member nations and assist in the peaceful resolution of
disagreements. Currently, one of the most pressing needs is joint management
of water resources.
- Actively oppose the polarization of Central Asia into several hostile camps.
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Along with these positive steps the United States can also endeavor to form a
coalition of like-minded states to the end of refusing all aid and credits to
Kazakhstan if it were in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This policy should
be announced beforehand and its implementation should be automatic. Since this
policy of fiscal sanctions would require little effort to implement through the World
Bank and similar institutions, it might retain rmore credibility than the imposition of
physical sanctions. By all means, physical sanctions should also be implemented;
however, the recent examples of Serbia and North Korea have cast doubt on their
effectiveness and reduced their credibility.
Kazakh concerns about security are deep and well founded. They must be
satisfied before non-nuclear status is assured. It can be taken as a given, that some
time in the next decade ethnic conflict will arise in Kazakhstan, and that when it does
there will be Russian political parties which will use this as a justification to call for
intervention in Kazakh internal affairs. Any steps that the United States can take to
assist Kazakhstan in the solution of its problems of national security are likely to
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